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A product liability law developed in accordance with ... limited federal
action ... will bring predictability and stability to the product liability
process and help stabilize product liability insurance rates. It will allow
consumers to know their rights. It also will give product sellers assurance
of "what the rules are," which would encourage research, development
and innovation in product manufacturing.1
Product liability is being touted as a national problem that demands a
national solution. This Alice In Wonderland approach by "big" business
and trade associations is utopian at best.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The lines are drawn for what promises to be one of the most
significant tort law battles in recent memory: preemption of state
product liability law through federal legislation. The mood of the
country, as reflected in federal regulatory budget cuts and a gen-
eral anti-big-government bias, would seem ill suited to advocacy of
federal reform of any kind. This would be especially true of re-
form tampering with the tort system, which has traditionally been
the almost exclusive domain of the states. However, despite the
political climate, and the general opposition of the organized bar,3
many members of the legal community, leaders of business and
industry, and members of Congress are convinced that federal
product liability reform is desirable and essential.4
To grasp the setting for this legal battle, one must appreciate
that product liability law is essentially judge-made.5 After many
years of common law development, the modern era of product lia-
bility arrived with enunciation of the doctrine of strict tort liability
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,6 and the subsequent
1. Victor E. Schwartz (former Chairman, Interagency Task Force on Product
Liability), Products Liability: Federal Legislation? Yes!, 11 THE BRIEF 4, 9
(1982).
2. James D. Ghiardi (Member, Committee on Tort Liability Study, ABA), Prod-
uct Liability: Federal Reform? No!, 11 THE BRIEF 5, 5 (1982).
3. A summary of the ABA's position can be found in Sevier, Federal Product
Liability Ac 11 THE BRIEF 3 (1982). The controversy engendered by federal
product liability tort reform is graphically illustrated in this issue, which con-
tains short articles by Professors Schwartz and Ghiardi, writing pro and con
on the issue of federal reform.
4. The Product Liability Alliance and the Coalition for Uniform Product Liabil-
ity each have over 200 member organizations representing broad-based busi-
ness support. Recently the Product Liability Act, S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), had more than 20 cosponsors. See infra notes 467-68 and accompany-
ing text.
5. Orban, Product Liability Today: An International Overview: The American
Situation, in FIRST WORLD CONGRESS ON PRODUCT LIABILIT 22 (1977).
6. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The doctrine was first
hinted at in Heningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960), a warranty action, but was clearly announced as sounding in tort in
Greenman.
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incorporation of a product liability cause of action in Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.7 The arrival of strict liabil-
ity in tort provoked no loud outcry for reform. Until the mid-1970's,
strict liability, with its expansion of plaintiffs' rights and remedies
for product-related injuries, was generally applauded by commen-
tators.8 Moreover, since product liability insurance was relatively
inexpensive and easy to obtain, and was apparently profitable for
insurers,9 there was only minimal grumbling from the business
sector.
During the period from 1974 to 1976, however, the situation
changed rapidly. References to a "product liability crisis" swept
through major firms, small businesses, and the insurance industry.
Many companies complained that product liability insurance was
becoming increasingly expensive, and, in some cases, difficult to
obtain at any price.10 This putative crisis, and its aftermath, have
engendered considerable criticism of the tort litigation system.
The system's detractors argue that the continued development of
strict liability has expanded the product manufacturer's potential
responsibility for product-related injury, and that the protection
offered by traditional defenses has waned, providing little relief
from burgeoning liability."1 As a result of this perceived imbalance
in the tort-litigation system, manufacturers and insurers have
urged state legislatures to enact product liability reform measures,
including statutes of repose, "state of the art" defenses, and de-
fenses arising from compliance with government safety regula-
7. The Restatement provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical -harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if,
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and,
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
8. See, e.g., Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C.L. REv. 643 (1978); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel: Strict Liability
to the Consumer, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
9. See R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIAABILrr LAW 4 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Federal Government and the Product Liability Prob-
lem: From Task Force Investigation to Decisions by the Administration, 47 U.
CiN. L. REV. 573, 574 (1978).
11. See generally Epstein, supra note 8.
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tions.12 Thus far, about half of the states have adopted some form
of product liability tort reform, and most states have considered
some sort of legislation.13
The federal government became involved in this area with the
establishment of the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability
in 1976. The Task Force contracted with three private research
contractors, each of which published a report in the spring of
1977.14 After the Task Force disbanded, the Department of Com-
merce continued its work and wrote the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act.15 It was hoped that the Model Uniform Act would
achieve widespread state adoption, such as that attained by the
Uniform Commercial Code.16
Meanwhile, in 1978, Congress modified the tax law to extend
loss-carryback provisions for product liability losses from three to
ten years.'7 More recently, Congress enacted the Product Liability
Risk Retention Act,18 which facilitates the pooling of reserves by
manufacturers to self-insure against product-related claims. How-
ever, federal action in the field of substantive product liability tort
reform has, to date, been limited to the promulgation of the Model
Uniform Act. Although several product liability reform proposals
have been introduced in Congress,' 9 none has been enacted into
law. Notwithstanding this present lack of federal action, and a
12. See, Schwartz, supra note 1, at 9.
13. The exact number of state product liability statutes is difficult to ascertain.
In a 1982 publication that contained three short articles on product liability
reform each article contained a different figure. Professor Schwartz put the
number at 22. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 9. Professor Ghiardi wrote that
there were 26 statutes. Ghiardi, supra note 2, at 8. Sevier, writing for the
A.B.A., had the highest figure: 28 states. Sevier, supra note 3, at 2.
Certainly, the fact that different writers cannot even agree upon the
number of product liability reform statutes the states have enacted serves to
demonstrate the degree of uncertainty in this field.
14. The Research Group, Inc., published the seven volume LEGAL STUDY. McKin-
sey & Co., Inc., prepared the single volume INSURANCE STUDY. The two vol-
ume INDUsTRY STUDY was written by Gordon Associates, Inc. The FiNAL
REPORT of the Task Force was published in November, 1977. These docu-
ments will hereinafter be cited respectively as the LEGAL STUDY, INSURANCE
STUDY, INDUSTRY STUDY, and FiNAL REPORT. The preliminary document pre-
pared by the Task Force was the Briefing Report, which will be cited as the
BRIEFING REPORT. A brief account of the Task Force's work, by its chairman,
can be found in Schwartz, supra note 10, at 573-75.
15. The text of the Act, and commentary, can be found at 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714-50
(1979). It should be noted that the Act was promulgated by the Department
of Commerce, and not by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws.
16. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 580-81.
17. 26 U.S.C. § 172(b) (1) (I) (1982).
18. Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949 (1981).
19. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 584 nn.42-43.
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
slowing of the drive for state reform,20 pressures are mounting for
the federal government to pass comprehensive uniform product li-
ability legislation.21
Federal product liability reform initiatives raise many impor-
tant issues. Opponents of federal reform are concerned about po-
tential disruption of the balance between federal power and states'
rights.22 These concerns merit attention. Nevertheless, this Arti-
cle urges federal action. The present system of state common law
legal development and piecemeal state statutory reform has cre-
ated a quagmire of uncertainty and exacts high costs from manu-
facturers, other sellers, insurers, and consumers alike.23 These
costs are unnecessary; in great measure they reflect the price of
uncertainty, rather than the cost of compensating injured
plaintiffs.
The Article will not explore the merits of specific reform pro-
posals; others have discussed and debated those issues. 24 Rather,
20. See Geisel, Business Gears for a Fight in '81 Drive for Tort Reform, Bus. Ins.,
Jan. 12, 1981, at 26.
21. See Geisel, National Health Bill Exceeds 10 percent of GNP, Bus. INs., Aug.
29, 1983, at 23; Geisel, Largest Agents' Group Backs Federal Tort Reform, Bus.
INs., June 21, 1982, at 18; Geisel, Federal Tort Reform Needed: Kasten, Bus.
INs., May 3, 1982 at 38.
22. See, e.g., Ghiardi, supra note 2.
23. Some have hinted broadly that efforts at product liability reform merely re-
flect attempts by manufacturers and insurers to deprive injured plaintiffs of
their right to adequate compensation for product-related injuries. See, e.g.,
Johnson, Products Liability Reform: A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REV.
677 (1978). While it is true that manufacturing and insurance groups have
been at the forefront of the product liability reform movement, such an argu-
ment assumes the conclusion that any legislation adopted would be anti-con-
sumer. Any such blanket assumption is unwarranted, and the final
legislative product could be decidedly pro-consumer. This Article argues
only that it is manifestly inefficient for insurers, manufacturers, and, ulti-
mately, the consumer, to pay only for unnecessary uncertainty. So long as
the legislation, be it plaintiff-oriented, or defendant-oriented, resolves the
present crazy-quilt of common law development and state statutory reform,
all parties will be better served. Cf. Schwartz, quoted in, Federal Rule One of
Many Proposals Eyed in Report to Gov't Advisory Unit, Nat'l. Underwriter,
Nov. 19, 1976, at 38.
24. See, e.g., Product Liability Reform, 1982: Hearings on S. 2631 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1982); Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Response to the
Product Liability Crisis, 14 FORUM 251 (1978); Coccia, The New Federalism in.
Products Liability, 10 FORUM 1057 (1975); Henderson, Manufacturers' Liabil-
ity for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 625 (1978); Herrington, Products Liability: Model Proposals for Legisla-
tive Reform, 43 AI. LiNE REV. 221 (1977); Hoenig, Products Liability Problems
and Proposed Reforms, 1977 INs. I.J. 213; Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed
Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663
(1978); Schwartz, Federal Action on Product Liability-What Has Occurred
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it addresses the much broader question of the level of government
at which reform should be adopted.25 In reaching the conclusion
that federal reform is the preferred solution to the current
problems of the product liability system, this Article proceeds in
three major sections. The first section illustrates the present, de-
gree of uncertainty in the field of product liability law caused by
common law judicial creativity, coupled with piecemeal state legis-
lative reform. The second section discusses the adverse effects of
uncertainty on insurers, manufacturers, and consumers. The third
section demonstrates the need for federal action, analyzing the in-
herent inability of state law to achieve uniformity and countering
objections to federal reform.
II. THE EXTENT OF UNCERTAINTY IN PRESENT
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
There is little dispute that one of the principal causes of the
product liability crisis is the tort litigation system, which "has be-
come filled with uncertainties creating a lottery for both insurance
rate makers and injured parties." 2 6 Despite the generally held
and What May Occur, 14 FORUM 287 (1978); Sherman, Legislative Responses
to Judicial Activism in Strict Liability, Reform or Reaction?, 44 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 359 (1978); Smith, Products Liability: A Compendium of Reform, 15
Hous. L. REV. 871 (1978); Twerski, National Product Liability Legislation: In
Search for the Best of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 411 (1982); Com-
ment, State Legislative Restrictions on Product Liability Actions, 29 MERCER
L. REV. 619 (1978).
25. Most of these commentators have been concerned only with the merits of
particular reform measures. No one has yet looked comprehensively beyond
the specifics of the proposals and examined the fundamental question: at
which level of our government reform should be adopted. It is true that some
commentators have briefly discussed this "level of laws" problem. For exam-
ple, the theme of uncertainty in the tort litigation system runs throughout the
documents prepared under the auspices of the Interagency Task Force. In
fact, the initial BRmMG REPORT of the Task Force stressed that meaningful
tort reform must be adopted at the federal level. BRIEFING REPORT, supra
note 14, at iv & 19-20. While later reports stressed the desirability of federal
reform, see, e.g., 4 LEGAL STUDy, supra note 14, at 71-72, the need for federal
reform was expressed in a less emphatic manner. Moreover, the ultimate
product of the Department of Commerce, the Model Uniform Product Liabil-
ity Act, is intended to be adopted on a state-by-state basis. The Model Act
has thus far been totally ineffective in achieving uniformity among the states.
See infra notes 366-70 and accompanying text. In any event, to the extent the
Task Force supported federal reform, it did so in an uncoordinated fashion,
scattered through hundreds of pages of documents.
26. BRIEFING REPORT, supra note 14, at iii. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 14,
at xxxix. It should be noted that this "lottery" is a bonanza for legal counsel.
A recent study released by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice
determined, for instance, that in asbestos-related product liability claims
closed during the last decade, litigation expenses consumed 63 percent of all
money spent by insurers and businesses. Bus. INs., Aug. 1, 1983, at 25. Argua-
19841
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view that the existing system generates uncertainty in product lia-
bility law, no single source has previously attempted to outline its
major parameters, which include: (1) multiple causes of action;
(2) divergent definitions of "defect"; (3) judicial creation and ex-
tention of theories of recovery; (4) differences in defenses allowed
in strict liability actions; and (5) variations in the admissibility of
"subsequent repairs" evidence. Finally, the Article will analyze
how state legislative reform efforts have exacerbated existing
uncertainties.
One caveat is in order. The purpose of this section is heuristic;
it shows by the steadily increasing weight of example the extent of
uncertainty in product liability law. The discussion is not intended
to represent a definitive state-by-state analysis of current law.
Product liability law is simply so uncertain that it would take sev-
eral volumes even to approach definitive treatment.
A. Multiple Causes of Action
"Product liability" is an overarching term that encompasses at
least three distinct causes of action: negligence, warranty, and
strict liability.2 7 These various theories combine to create uncer-
tainty because different jurisdictions often recognize varying com-
binations of them. Further, a single jurisdiction may apply
different theories within the context of a single case.28 This may
be especially confusing for juries.
That uncertainty arises from applying different legal theories to
the same facts is obvious and requires little discussion. However,
one nuance that is often overlooked is that these differing causes
of action can complicate something as simple and mechanical as
ascertaining the applicable statute of limitations. 29 The principal
issue is whether the tort or contract statute of limitations will ap-
ply. The distinction can be critical. In tort actions the statute usu-
bly, legal research costs, greatly enhanced by multiple jurisdiction product
liability uncertainty, see infra notes 321-24 and accompanying text, composed
a substantial component of the overall litigation expense.
27. See LEGAL STUDY supra note 14, at 86-87; Smith, supra note 24, at 872. See
also Woodling, Georgia Products Liability Law: An Overview, reprinted in
Ga. Gen. Assembly of 1978, REPORT OF THE SENATE PRODUCTS LIABILrrY
STuDY COMmrrEE, at app. D [hereinafter cited as GA. LEGIs. REP.]. Woodling
lists four causes of action, splitting the warranty cause of action into express
warranty and implied warranty. Id.
28. See, e.g., Oldham's Farm Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. App.
1982) (plaintiff's recovery properly reached through the combination of strict
liability tort law with express and implied warranty theories of contract law).
29. It has, for example, been noted that: "As the law presently stands, there are
usually several statutes of limitation potentially applicable to a products
cause of action, with the plaintiff often determining the choice of statute by
how he elects to plead his claim." Phillips, supra note 24, at 663.
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ally runs two years from the date of injury or property damage,
with an additional period allowed for the plaintiff to discover the
injury or damage. Under a contract statute, however, the period
may be more extended. For example, under U.C.C. section 2-725,
the period is four years from the date of delivery.30 The results
have varied, but a few generalizations can be made. In actions
based on negligence, the tort statute has usually been applied.3 1 In
warranty actions, some courts have applied the contract statute of
limitations, but others have employed the tort statute.32
The advent of strict liability in tort failed to curtail this confu-
sion, if only because some jurisdictions have failed to accept the
doctrine at all, while others have applied it only in certain situa-
tions.3 3 In addition, strict liability provided yet another cause of
action and did not supersede product actions based on warranty or
negligence.
Finally, the problem of which statute of limitations to apply is
exacerbated in cases that involve multistate contracts. For exam-
ple, cases regularly arise involving contracts with two states. One
state may recognize strict liability and the other only warranty.3 4
Because of the uncertainty that permeates the field of conflict of
law, this creates additional confusion.3 5
30. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978).
31. See, e.g., Goodman v. Magnavox Co., 443 A.2d 945 (Me. 1982). See generally
Note, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation: An Effective Means of Implement-
ing Change in Products Liability Law?, 30 CASE W. RES. 123, 129 (1979).
32. Compare Johnson v. Hockesin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del. App. 1980)
(breach of implied warranty actions subject to the U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions) with Witherspoon v. General Motors Corp., 535 F.Supp. 432 (D. Mo.
1982) (actions for breach of implied warranty governed by the statute of limi-
tations on personal injury claims).
33. See Note, supra note 31, at 131-32.
34. Id. at 132.
35. The choice of law issue is complicated further when statutes of limitation are
characterized as merely procedural, and thus governed by the law of the fo-
rum. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFucTs LAw 127, at 252-56 (3d ed. 1977).
Application of this traditional rule to product liability actions can create spe-
cial problems:
For example, if a product liability suit were brought in State A,
which has a tort statute of limitation, the tort limitation would be
used. If in the same suit, however, the substantive law of State B, the
state in which the cause of action arose, were to apply, and State B
adhered to a warranty cause of action for products liability claims,
State A's tort limitation period could conceivably be measured from
the date-of-sale of the injurious product, rather than from the date of
injury. The result of the interplay of traditional choice of law rules is
a hybrid statute of limitation without allegiance to either tort or con-
tract principles.
Note, supra note 31, at 133 (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, perhaps
the tort limitation, measured from the date of injury, would simply be applied
to State B's warranty cause of action. One possible solution is to view stat-
19841
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The difficulties created by differing causes of action have been
recognized by nearly all of the commentators, who have urged the
adoption of a single cause of action.36 There is an emerging con-
sensus that "[i]f the crisis of uncertainty in the products liability
insurance field is to be dealt with effectively, then strong action
must be taken to adopt a single cause of action."37
B. Differing Interpretations of the Meaning of "Defect"
Differing causes of action provide the most obvious example of
uncertainty in the broad field of product liability. But further un-
certainty is also created when different jurisdictions apply these
causes of action. Regarding the strict liability cause of action, for
instance, jurisdictions are widely divided over what constitutes a
"defective" product, even though proof of a product "defect" is a
sine qua non in strict liability cases.
A large majority of states now recognize the doctrine of strict
liability in tort.38 Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
utes of limitation as substantive. Under this view, if the court applies one
state's substantive law, it also applies that state's statute of limitations. R.
LuFLAR, supra, at 253. There may be some movement in this direction. See,
e.g., Heavener v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). See also UNI-
FORM CONFLICT OF LAWS - LIMITATIONS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 46 (Supp. 1983).
36. See, e.g., Green, Strict Liability under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of
Litigation, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1976); Keeton, Product Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973). But see 4 LEGAL STUDY,
supra note 14, at 98 n.26, noting the opposite position taken by the Defense
Research Institute, Inc.. That is, that it is unrealistic to attempt to reverse 200
years of jurisprudence and speculate on what the system might be like with
only one cause of action.
37. 4 LEGAL STUDY, supra note 14, at 87-88. The commentators do not agree on
what that cause of action should be. Id. at 93; 1 id., at 37; 2 id., at 5. The
contractor that prepared the LEGAL STUDY suggests that the cause of action
should recognize that most product liability law is still basically negligence
law. 4 id., at 87. In manufacturing cases, however, the LEGAL STUDY would
focus on the product itself, and not on the manufacturer's conduct. Thus, if
the product were defectively manufactured (i.e., did not conform to the man-
ufacturer's specifications or design), the manufacturer would be liable, even
if the manufacturer exercised due care in manufacturing the product. This is
closely akin to a negligence per se concept, and differs little from how strict
liability is applied in manufacturing defect cases. See Sherman, supra note
24, at 366, 371.
By aligning design defect and duty to warn cases with negligence law, the
LEGAL STUDY explicitly articulates the actual rationale of many courts, de-
spite the rubric of "strict liability." See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 24, at
634-59; Sherman, supra note 24, at 363 & n.26. The LEGAL STUDY bases its sin-
gle cause of action approach on the work of Professor Wade. 4 LEGAL STUDY,
supra note 14, at 88. See generally Wade, supra note 36.
38. At least 36 states have adopted strict liability in tort, with only three states
expressly rejecting it. See GA. LEGIS. REP., supra note 27, at 4.
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Torts provides the most commonly accepted formulation of the
doctrine: "One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability .... -39 The key words are "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous"; the plaintiff must prove that the defend-
ant's product was in such condition in order to recover. The Re-
statement formulation has caused much difficulty. Promulgated in
the infancy of strict tort liability, the Restatement was formulated
without the benefit of much common law development, and in
many respects did not restate the law of strict products liability so
much as state it.40 The common law development of strict liability,
therefore, came after Section 402A was promulgated, with much of
that development struggling to give meaning to the concept of
"defect." 41
Unfortunately, the only consensus regarding the present mean-
ing of "defect" is that there is no consensus. 42 The courts have de-
veloped numerous formulations, but none has proven entirely
satisfactory. California rejects the Restatement's formula that a
plaintiff must prove the product to be "unreasonably dangerous"
in addition to being "defective."43 The California courts fear that
the words "unreasonably dangerous" might introduce negligence-
related considerations into strict liability cases.44 Wisconsin has
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) (emphasis added).
40. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963), was the first case to consider the doctrine of strict liability in tort.
The standard announced was that a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when its product "proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human be-
ing." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The Restatement added the
requirement that the defective condition be "unreasonably dangerous." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
41. Section 402A and the comments following it have been criticized as necessar-
ily leading to divergent results: "[U]nderstandably, these explanations [in
the comments] with the circular use of the phrase 'unreasonably dangerous'
have led to conflicting judicial interpretations, as well as to numerous sug-
gested readings by the commentators." Sherman, supra note 24, at 362 (foot-
notes omitted). Others, while recognizing the difficulties with the
Restatement definition, seem to take a more charitable view. See Epstein,
supra note 8, at 648-49.
Of course, the fact that common law development regarding strict liability
occurred after the Restatement does not change the fact that the law of strict
liability is now essentially judge-made.
42. Sources within which varying positions of the courts and commentators as to
the meaning of the phrase may be found in Sherman, supra note 24, at 362-63
nn. 21-22.
43. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972).
44. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. Any such negligence-related
considerations were deemed irrelevant. Many courts have favored the Re-
statement approach over that adopted in Cronin. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Gen-
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indicated that the Restatement definition is equivalent to negli-
gence per se.45 New York recognizes a cause of action called strict
product liability, but the doctrine is essentially negligence-based,
and, unlike the Restatement, recognizes contributory negligence
as a defense.46 Other interpretations are summarized by the Final
Report of the Interagency Task Force: "Substitutions for the 'un-
reasonably dangerous' test include the imposition of liability in
Washington if the product is 'not reasonably safe' or, in Oregon, if
the product is 'dangerously defective.' Still another view is that the
term defective is synonymous with 'unreasonably dangerous.' "47
The definition problem has been especially acute in cases that
allege design defects.48 The problem of defining "defects" in de-
sign cases stems not only from the vagueness of the Restatement's
eral Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1361-62 (Okla. 1974); Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 494-95, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974).
In Barker v. Lull Eng'g, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978),
the California Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that
Cronin should be applied only to manufacturing defect cases, and not to de-
sign defect cases. In Barker, the court reversed a jury verdict for the defend-
ants on the basis of an erroneous jury charge. The trial court had instructed
the jury that the product must be found "unreasonably dangerous for its in-
tended use."
The California court refined the definition of "defect" applicable in design
defect cases as follows:
[A] product is defective in design either (1) if the product had failed
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if, in
light of the relevant factors discussed below, the benefits of the chal-
lenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design.
Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228. The court thus indicated that it
is proper to give the jury instructions explaining the meaning of "defect." Id.
at 427, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234. The "relevant factors" discussed in
the second part of the announced standard include: the gravity of the danger
of the design; the probability that the danger would occur; the mechanical
feasibility of safer alternative designs; the cost of the improvement; and any
adverse consequences to the product or to the consumer resulting from the
alternative design. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
When the second prong of the standard comes into play, the burden of
proving that the benefits outweigh the risk is imposed on the defendant, after
the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the injury was caused by the
product's design. Id.
45. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 461-62, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (1967).
46. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387-88, 348 N.E.2d 571, 576, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115, 122 (1976); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 344, 298 N.E.2d 622, 631, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1967).
47. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at U1-7. A brief summary of the various positions
can be found at id. 11-6 to 8.
48. See, e.g., id. at H1-6; 2 LEGAL STuDy, supra note 14, at 23, 40. The problem of
definition does not often surface in manufacturing defect cases: "the product
design provides a specific, built-in standard against which to measure the le-
gal adequacy of the particular product that injured the plaintiff." Henderson,
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formulation, but also from the inherent difficulty in applying strict
liability to design cases. A particular product design represents a
conscious choice by a manufacturer. That choice must, therefore,
be evaluated in the context of risks known at the time of manufac-
ture, unless a manufacturer is to be held liable for unknowable
risks, a position that most courts have been unwilling to take.4 9
Thus, most commentators agree that strict liability cases involving
design defects are basically indistinguishable from negligence
cases,50 and that they necessarily involve a weighing of the risks
and benefits of product designs.5 1 Such practices make the poten-
tial liability "strict" in name only.
Further, the weighing of risks and benefits in design cases in-
volves consideration of different factors, including the utility of a
product, the likelihood that it will cause serious injury, the availa-
bility of substitutes, and the ability of manufacturers to increase
product safety without reducing product utility.52 Courts and com-
supra note 24, at 626 (footnote omitted). See also, FNAL REPORT, supra note
14, at 11-6.
49. See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975);
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Christofferson v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 15 Cal. App.
3d 756, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971); Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d
1383 (1976); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974).
But see Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982) (state-of-the-art defense inapplicable in product liability case).
50. See, e.g., FinAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11-8. See also Henderson, supra note
24, at 635. Of course, the fact that some courts continue to insist that manu-
facturers be held strictly liable for their design choices, regardless of whether
those choices were reasonable, only adds to the uncertainty. See id. at 634-35.
See also Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 538
(1982).
For a general discussion of fault concepts in strict product liability, see
Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777
(1983).
51. E.g., FNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11-9.
52. A fairly comprehensive list of factors has been developed by Dean Wade:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too ex-
pensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in
the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowl-
edge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of
suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading
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mentators, however, disagree on which of these factors (or others)
should be considered, or which should be given the greatest
weight.53 This only multiplies the confusion. Of course, deciding
design cases upon negligence principles while continuing to ad-
here to the rubric of "strict liability" is in itself confusing, and
likely to lead to unprincipled decisions.5 4 The result has been in-
creased reliance on "conclusory expert testimony" in sending de-
sign cases to the jury, and thus "the... common law approach in
design cases is essentially a lottery."55
C. Judicial Creation and Extension of Theories of Recovery
Courts can, and do, develop new theories of recovery for prod-
uct liability plaintiffs, hence new theories of liability for defend-
ants. The most obvious example is the creation of strict tort
liability itself. The creation of new theories epitomizes the uncer-
tainty that confronts the product manufacturer. Both manufactur-
ers and insurers necessarily operate in light of existing law, and
never know when the courts may thrust new legal theories upon
them long after products have been developed and "properly" in-
sured. Courts will also sometimes extend theories of recovery far
beyond their existing scope. This section examines two specific
examples of judicial creation and extension of theories of recovery.
1. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories and Its Progeny
Perhaps the most significant recent example of creation of new
theories of recovery was the development of the concept of "mar-
ket share liability" in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. 56 The Sindell
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.
Wade, supra note 36, at 837-38.
53. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at II-10 to 12; Smith, supra note 24,
at 874-79.
54. See Henderson, supra note 24, at 635.
55. Id. at 626-27.
56. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1981). The decision has generated voluminous commentary. See, e.g., Berns
& Lykos, Sindell v. Abott Labs-"The Heir of the Citadel," 15 FORUM 1031
(1980); Market Share Liability-A New Theory for DES Cases, 4 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 492 (1980); Selected Recent Court Decisions-Product Quality and
Safety, 7 Am. J.L. & MED. 213 (1981) [herinafter cited as Selected Recent Court
Decisions]; Note, DES: Judicial Interest in Balancing and Innovation, 22
B.C.L. REV. 747 (1981); Note, Sindell v. Abbott Labs: A Market Share Ap-
proach to DES Causation, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1179 (1981); Note, Market Share
Liability: A New Method of Recovery for D.E.S. Litigants, 30 CATH. U.L. REV.
551 (1981); Note, Industry-Wide Liability and Market Share Allocation of
Damages, 15 GA. L. REv. 423 (1981); Comment, Sindell v. Abbott Labs-Be-
yond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases, 14 IND. L. REv. 695 (1981); Note, Tort,
19 J. FAM. L. 554 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability for DES (Diethyl-
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case, and related cases in other jurisdictions,5 7 illustrate both the
development of new theories of recovery and the varying ways in
which multiple jurisdictions can deal with similar fact patterns.
Sindell is one of the many "latent disease" cases brought
against a group of pharmaceutical manufacturers of the drug
Diethylstilbestol (DES). Widely used in the 1950's and early
1960s, 58 DES was later found to cause cancer and precancerous
growths in some of the daughters of women treated with it.59 The
primary difficulty faced by these plaintiffs was one of causation:
establishing which of the more than two hundred companies man-
ufacturing the drug actually produced the particular drug taken by
their mothers.6 0 This made recovery impossible under conven-
tional theories of liability. Absent proof of causation, the plaintiffs
could not prevail, regardless of whether suit was brought in inten-
tional tort, negligence, or strict liability.61
The facts of Sindell illustrate the problem. By the time the case
reached the California Supreme Court, only five of the more than
two hundred DES manufacturers that might have produced the
drug remained as defendants.62 It was impossible to determine
which of the remaining defendants, if any of them, actually manu-
factured the drug. Despite the obvious problems with causation,
the court fashioned a theory to allow the plaintiff to recover:
[W] e hold it to be reasonable in the present context to measure the likeli-
hood that any of the defendants supplied the product which allegedly in-
jured the plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by each of them
for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production of
the drug sold by all for that purpose.6 3
The court required only that the plaintiffs initially join "manufac-
turers of a substantial share of the DES which her mother might
stilbestol) Injury: A New High Water Mark in Tort Law, 60 NEB. L. REv. 432
(1981); Note, California Expands Tort Liability Under the Novel "Market
Share" Theory: Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1011 (1981);
Comment, Refining Market Share Liability: Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 33 STAN.
L. REV. 937 (1981); Comment, Sindell v. Abbott Labs: A High Water Mark in
Tort Law?, 1981 UT L. REv. 655. See generally Annot., 2 A.LR. 4th 1091
(1980).
57. See infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
58. Selected Recent Court Decisions, supra note 56, at 213.
59. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 595, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 133 (1980).
60. See, e.g., Selected Recent Court Decisions, supra note 56, at 214.
61. The general rule is that: "An essential element of the plaintiffs cause of ac-
tion for negligence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some
reasonable connection between the act of omission of the defendant and the
damage which the plaintiff has suffered." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 236 (4th ed. 1971).
62. Eleven defendants had originally been named in the complaint. Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 593, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 132 (1980).
63. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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have taken."64 Should the plaintiffs then prevail, each defendant
would be held liable in proportion to its market share.65
Sindell represented a major extension of liability against manu-
facturers of potentially dangerous generic products. It is impor-
tant to note that the decision is not merely an application of the
previously recognized doctrine of alternative liability. Alternative
liability allows a plaintiff who is unable to identify which of a group
of potentially liable defendants caused his injury to shift the bur-
den to the defendants to prove lack of causation, provided the
plaintiff can join all potentially liable defendants in the suit.66 The
Sindell court rejected the application of alternative liability pre-
cisely because that doctrine requires each potentially liable de-
fendant to be before the court, it being certain that one of them
caused the plaintiffs injuries.67 Since only five of the more than
two hundred companies that produced the drug were before the
court, it could not be assumed that any of the five defendants actu-
ally produced the product that caused the plaintiffs injury. The
court did, however, view its market share theory as an adaption of
the alternative liability theory.68 In addition, the Sindell court re-
jected two other proposed theories of liability: a "concert of ac-
tion" theory, and an industry-wide or "enterprise liability"
theory.69
DES decisions since Sindell have yielded conflicting results.
Various jurisdictions have approached DES cases from a wide va-
riety of theoretical bases. In Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,70 the Michigan
Court of Appeals ruled that partial summary judgment should not
64. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court rejected a sugges-
tion by a student commentator that manufacturers comprising at least 75 to
80 percent of the market should be joined as defendants. Comment, DES and
a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FoRDHAM L. REV. 963, 996 (1978).
65. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
145 (1980).
66. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (plaintiff shot by two
hunters discharging their firearms simultaneously, and could not prove
which defendant actually hit him; burden properly shifted to defendants to
establish who fired the shot, or to apportion the damages between them). See
also Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1948) (plaintiff injured
while operation performed on another part of his body, and unable to prove
which defendant injured him; doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable despite
causation problems as to any one defendant-the circumstances "call upon
the defendant to explain the results"). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note
61, at 243; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (3) comments f-h (1965).
67. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 2d 588, 602-03, 607 P.2d 924, 929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 139 (1980).
68. Id. at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
69. Id. at 603-10, 607 P.2d at 933-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141-43.
70. 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980). Actually, Abel was decided shortly
before the California Supreme Court's decision in Sindell.
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have been granted for the defendants against the plaintiff's claim
of alternative liability,71 nor against the plaintiff's claim based
upon a concert of action theory.72 The Michigan court, however,
expressly declined to adopt an enterprise liability theory.7 3 In Fer-
rigno v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,74 a New Jersey Superior Court judge con-
sidered the DES question under New Jersey law.7 5 The judge
ruled that the manufacturer could be held liable on a theory of al-
ternative liability, expressly rejecting Sindell's limitation on that
theory that all potential defendants must be brought before the
court.7 6 The Ferrigno judge did, however, adopt Sindell's market
share approach to apportion damages.7 7 More recently, in Bichler
v. Eli Lilly & Co.,78 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's award of damages to a DES plaintiff. Noting that the
jury had not found the defendant to have been the manufacturer of
the DES prescribed for the plaintiff's mother,79 the court neverthe-
less affirmed the imposition of liability under a modified concert of
action theory. The theory was based on the concept that the de-
fendant and other manufacturers cooperated in the testing and
marketing of the DES.80
Other courts have refused to hold manufacturers liable in DES
cases where causation could not be demonstrated. In Namm v.
71. Id. at 73-77, 289 N.W.2d at 25-27. Abel did not present the same difficulties
regarding alternative liability as Sindell. The plaintiffs alleged that the
named defendants constituted all of the known DES manufacturers who had
supplied the drug during the relevant time period. Id. at 67, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
72. Id. at 71-73, 289 N.W.2d at 24-25. For a more detailed discussion of the concept
of action theory, see Reed & Davison, The DES Cases and Liability Without
Causation, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 515-17 (1982).
73. Abel v. Eli Lilly Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 77, 289 N.W.2d 20, 27 (1980).
74. 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980).
75. The court raised the issue on its own motion in order to limit the trial to the
"core controversy," and resolved the issue as if brought on cross motions for
summary judgment. Id. at 558, 420 A.2d at 1308.
76. Id. at 569-70, 420 A.2d at 1314-15. The court refused to consider the enterprise
liability theory, and found the concert of action theory not applicable.
77. Id. at 572-73, 420 A.2d at 1316.
78. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
79. Id. at 319, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
80. Id. at 321-31, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628-33. Bichler has since been described as the
only DES case to find liability on the concert of action theory. Morton v. Ab-
bott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 597 (M.D. Fla. 1982). A new theory of industry-
wide liability has recently been fashioned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984), the court
adopted a "risk contribution" approach, under which each defendant drug
manufacturer that could have made the pills taken by plaintiff's mother
would share in any damage award in proportion to its contribution to the risk
created by the industry in marketing the drug. A similar risk contribution
theory was proposed in Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflec-
tions on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982).
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Charles E. Frosst & Co.,81 a New Jersey intermediate appellate
court rejected both the alternative liability and enterprise liability
theories. The court expressly disagreed with the Ferrigno judge's
reading of the applicable precedent,82 thus demonstrating the un-
certainty new theories can create within a single jurisdiction. Sim-
ilarly, in Payton v. Abbott Labs,83 a federal district court, applying
Massachusetts law, granted the defendant/manufacturer's motion
for partial summary judgment, and refused to adopt concert of ac-
tion, aiding and abetting, or joint venture theories to get over the
causation hurdle.84 The court also refused to consider adopting a
more novel approach, such as market share liability, viewing that
to be the proper province of the Massachusetts courts, and not a
federal district court sitting in diversity.85 Finally, in Ryan v. Eli
Lilly & Co. ,86 a federal district court refused to bypass the causa-
tion requirement by finding a civil conspiracy.8 7 The court also re-
jected the concert of action, alternative liability, and enterprise
liability theories.88 In addition, the court rejected Sindell's market
share approach, not only because it was not applicable to the facts
of the case, 89 but also because the approach had no foundation
under North Carolina or South Carolina law.90
The DES cases demonstrate graphically how state courts can
create new law in deciding product liability cases, and how widely
divergent that law becomes as it develops. Moreover, these new
theories of liability are not limited to DES cases. They are poten-
tially applicable to any situation in which a fungible product
causes an injury, and the manufacturer cannot be identified.9 1 For
example, these theories might be applied in cases involving asbes-
tos, aluminum wiring, and Agent Orange.92
81. 173 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981).
82. Id. at 32 n.3, 427 A.2d at 1127 n.3.
83. 512 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass. 1981).
84. Id at 1037-39. In Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982), the
court adopted the position taken by Payton that "to support liability under
the concert theory, a defendant's conduct must itself have been tortious." Id.
at 596.
85. Payton v. Abbott Labs., 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (D. Mass. 1981). See also
Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981).
86. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
87. Id. at 1012-14. The position in Ryan has since been specifically adopted in
Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
88. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1015-18 (D.S.C. 1981).
89. The plaintiff had not joined defendants representing a "substantial share" of
the market. Id. at 1018.
90. Id. at 1018-19.
91. See, e.g., Reed & Davison, supra note 72, at 515-17.
92. Id. at 519. In an asbestos cases in Georgia, it appears that the "market share"
concept will not be adopted, since it would be "contrary to Georgia's product
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2. Extension of the Duty to Warn to Manufacturers and
Suppliers of Bulk Products
A second source of uncertainty in product liability law arises
when courts extend the parameters of existing theories. The ex-
tension of the "duty to warn" to manufacturers and suppliers of
bulk products, especially chemicals, illustrates this point.
Chemical products are often manufactured in bulk. They are
then sold in tank cars to distributors who drain them off into fifty-
five gallon drums and sell them to wholesalers. Wholesalers fre-
quently repackage the chemicals in quart containers and sell them
to retailers who in turn purvey them to the general public. By the
time a chemical product reaches an ultimate consumer, it may
have been through as many as seven or eight steps in the distribu-
tion chain. Not only has the product been repackaged, it may have
been blended with other chemicals or otherwise remanufactured.
If the product injures the ultimate consumer, he may attempt to
recover against those in the distribution chain, often for failure to
warn. Since the initial manufacturer or a large supplier at the top
end of the distribution chain is likely to have the deepest pocket,
the issue becomes whether that bulk manufacturer or supplier had
any duty to warn the ultimate consumer of potential dangers inci-
dent to the product's use.
As a general matter, most courts have found that a duty to warn
extends beyond the immediate purchaser of a product.93 This view
is buttressed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which im-
poses liability for negligent failure to warn, stipulating that "[o] ne
who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for an-
other to use. . ." may be subject to liability.94 The Comments to
liability rule that a manufacturer is not an insurer of his product." Starling v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183, 190 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
93. Frumer and Friedman explain that: 'There is authority that adequate warn-
ing to the purchaser terminates the manufacturers' liability. But other cases,
representing a better and more modern view, hold the manufacturer liable
for failure to adequately warn other persons who might be foreseeably sub-
ject to danger." 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIAmILrY 173-80
(1982).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (emphasis added). Failure to
warn may also form the basis for an action based on strict liability. Id. at
§ 402A comment j. Despite the great differences between strict liability and
negligence theories in cases involving manufacturing defects, the courts
have noted that the concepts are not materially different in duty to warn
cases. See, e.g., Lancaster, Silo & Block v. Northern Propane Gas, 75 A.D.2d
55, 65, 427 N.Y.S. 2d 1009, 1015 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541 (1979). But see Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 91 N.J. 191, 204-09, 447 A.2d 539, 548-49 (1982)
(strict liability duty to warn, unlike negligence formula, does not require as-
sessment of defendant's culpability).
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this section make it clear that this duty can extend to "those who
are members of a class whom the supplier should expect to use it
[the chattel] or occupy it or share in its use. . . ."95 Furthermore,
it is noted that this duty is not necessarily discharged by providing
a sufficient warning only to the immediate person to whom it is
supplied: "The question remains whether this method gives a rea-
sonable assurance that the information will reach those whose
safety depends on their having it."96
The courts have, however, recognized exceptions to any duty to
warn the ultimate consumer. For example, it has generally been
held that drug manufacturers have no duty to warn the ultimate
consumer of dangers from prescription drugs.97 The courts reason
that an adequate warning to the prescribing physician is usually
sufficient.98 Some courts have developed a similar exception for
bulk suppliers and manufacturers, arguing that any duty to warn is
discharged by an adequate warning given by the supplier or manu-
facturer to the immediate purchaser.99 Other courts have rejected
any such exception, and have found that the bulk manufacturer or
supplier's duty can properly extend to the ultimate user or con-
sumer.100 These latter cases have tended to avoid a duty analysis
and have viewed the question as being one going to the overall ad-
equacy of the warning-a question for the jury. However, closer
examination of two of these cases reveals remarkably different
approaches.
In Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc. ,101 bulk suppliers of propane gas
were joined as defendants with a retail distributor in a case involv-
ing a gas explosion. Propane gas manufactured and supplied by
the various defendants had escaped from a leaky pipe, and trav-
eled through two feet of earth, collecting in a storm cellar. As it
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 comment a (1965).
96. Id. at comment n.
97. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Hawkins v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 481, 482-83, 249
S.E.2d 286, 287-88 (1978).
98. See, e.g., Bacardi v. Holzman, 182 N.J. Super. 422, 425, 442 A.2d 617,.619 (1981).
99. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Cal. Co., 255 F.2d 265, 269 (10th Cir. 1958); Kapp v. E.I.
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 57 F. Supp. 32, 37-38 (E.D. Mich. 1944); Zunck v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 224 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Jones v. Hittle
Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 638-39, 549 P.2d 1383, 1392 (1976); Younger v. Dow
Corning Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 682, 451 P.2d 177, 184 (1969); Morris v. Shell Oil
Co., 467 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Mo. 1971) Reed v. Penwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718,
720-23, 591 P.2d 478, 480-81 (1979).
100. See, e.g., Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1344-45 (9th Cir.
1981); Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 1976); Shell
Oil v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 443, 581 P.2d 271, 278 (1978); First Nat'l. Bank in
Alburquerque v. Nov-Am Ag. Prods., 88 N.M. 74, 84-85, 537 P.2d 682, 688-89
(1975).
101. 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976).
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filtered through the earth, much of the odor added to the gas was
absorbed. The plaintiff's decedents went to the storm cellar to get
some tomatoes stored there. One of them lit a match and the gas
exploded, causing their deaths. The plaintiff argued that the de-
fendants failed to warn adequately of the propensities of the gas.
The court disagreed, and affirmed summary judgment for the bulk
suppliers:
A bulk supplier to a retail distributor is in an entirely different position
from one who sells packaged commodities or deals directly with the con-
sumer. If the goods are packaged it is entirely feasible for the manufac-
turer to include an appropriate warning on the package.... If the
product is sold in bulk, adequate warning to the vendee is all that can
reasonably be required.' 0 2
A vastly different approach is illustrated by Shell Oil Co. v. Gut-
tierez.10 3 In Guttierez, Shell, the manufacturer, sold a chemical in
tank cars and trucks to its distributor, which transferred the prod-
uct to storage tanks and then packaged it in fifty-five gallon drums.
The distributor labeled these drums, indicating they contained a
"FLAMMABLE LIQUID," and resold the product to Westinghouse,
the plaintiff's employer. After Westinghouse emptied the drums,
they should have been returned immediately for refilling, or at
least rinsed out and tightly capped. Westinghouse, however, was
apparently not careful in handling the drums, and one of the plain-
tiffs used a drum to make a makeshift scaffolding to perform weld-
ing in the yard. When he lit his torch the drum exploded, causing
severe injuries to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued those in the
distribution line, including Shell.
Unlike the court in Jones, the Guttierez court held that Shell's
duty could extend to the ultimate consumer:
Shell being a bulk supplier in car load lots and not having direct access
to the container does not insulate it against liability. Labeling the
container is but one of the methods which may give adequate warn-
ing ... Lack of access to the final form in which the product reaches the
user is simply one of the considerations bearing upon the existence and
extent of duty.104
Both the legal analysis and the outcome differ in Jones and Gut-
tierez. In Jones, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment
for the defendant. In Guttierez, the appellate court affirmed a
$2,000,000 jury verdict for the plaintiffs. These cases exemplify the
uncommon ways common law state courts extend existing liability
theories.
102. Id. at 637, 549 P.2d at 1393.
103. 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (1978).
104. Id. at 434, 581 P.2d at 279.
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D. Varying Defenses Allowed in Strict Liability
Courts in the various jurisdictions have further promoted tort
uncertainty by their handling of defenses allowed in product liabil-
ity cases. This has been especially true in cases predicated on
strict tort liability. So widely does the law vary from state to state
that few accurate generalizations can be made concerning the de-
fenses that courts will allow.
The current state of the law might be summarized in the obser-
vation that contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liabil-
ity actions, but that misuse'05 and assumption of risk06 are. Such
a summary, however, would ignore jurisdictions in which contribu-
tory negligence may be a defense, 0 7 or where the contributory
negligence bar has been replaced by comparative fault concepts. 0 8
105. That is, using a product in an unintended and not reasonably foreseeable
manner. See W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILrY 269-70 (1979).
106. That is, voluntarily and knowingly encountering a product-related danger.
This is the rule of the Restatement:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possiblity of its existence. On
the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known dan-
ger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a
defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the
user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger,
and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product
and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
RESTATMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment n (1965). See generally
Annot., supra note 56.
107. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1974); Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1977) (applying New Hampshire Law). New
Hampshire has judicially adopted a 50 percent-type comparative fault ap-
proach in product liability cases. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 118 N.H.
802, 808, 395 A.2d 843, 848 (1978). Several New Jersey cases have also hinted
that contributory negligence can be a defense to an action in strict liability.
See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402,290 A.2d 281 (1972); Ettin v. Ava
Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969); Maiorino v. Wecs Prods.
Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965) (warranty action). Although these cases
imply that contributory negligence may be available as a defense to a strict
liability action, they indicate the defense is quite limited, perhaps to situa-
tions other courts would denominate as assumption of the risk. Contributory
negligence in product actions is now treated under New Jersey's modified
comparative negligence statute. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach.
Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
108. Comparative negligence has been judicially adopted in Alaska, California,
Florida, and New Mexico. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 304, 532 P.2d 1226, 19 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman
v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234
(1981). Comparative negligence has been legislatively adopted in several
states. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (1979); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-
801 to 806 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a-b (1976); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 156 (1980); R.L GEN. LAws § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1982).
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It would also fail to account for states that disallow misuse as a
defense,109 and those that have created other defenses through leg-
islation, such as a "state of the art defense."110 Finally, such an
abbreviated description of current law would overlook the fact that
courts differ widely in how they define commonly accepted de-
fenses like assumption of risk."' A closer examination of some of
these issues will illustrate the degree of uncertainty.
At present, most jurisdictions allow misuse to be asserted as an
affirmative defense, if the use of the product by the consumer is
not one that the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen.112
Since this defense in effect goes to the issue of causation (i.e., that
the plaintiff's misuse caused his injury), some states have refused
to recognize it.113 For example, Pennsylvania holds misuse is not a
separate defense in strict liability cases and that evidence of mis-
use can be used only to rebut the plaintiff's claims about defective-
ness and proximate cause.114 Some states, on the other hand,
appear to hold that the plaintiff must prove freedom from unfore-
seeable misuse.11 5
In those jurisidictions that allow the misuse defense, the crucial
element is foreseeability, which is usually considered a question of
fact for the jury." 6 Thus, the type of conduct held to constitute
109. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
112. See Kroon v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1223, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1979);
Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 86, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (1978); Gangi v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 81, 83, 360 A.2d 907, 909 (1976); Ford Motor Co.
v. Lee, 237 Ga. 554, 558, 229 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1976); Back v. Wickes Corp., 375
Mass. 633, 641, 378 N.E.2d 964, 969-70 (1978); Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb.
468, 485, 283 N.W.2d 25, 37 (1979); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 370,
498 P.2d 366, 369-70 (1972); McLaughlin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 N.H. 264,
266-67, 281 A.2d 587, 588-89 (1971). Some state statutes expressly provide that
misuse of the product is an affirmative defense. See Amz. REV. STATE. ANN.
§ 12-683 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(b) (2) (Burns Supp. 1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 28-01.1-.07 (Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-32 (Supp. 1982).
The Idaho Product Liability Reform Act subsumes misuse under a compara-
tive negligence scheme. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1301 to 1309 (1979). See also MIcH.
CoMp. LAws Ann. § 600.2949 (Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (Cum.
Supp. 1980).
113. See, e.g., Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Iowa 1980).
114. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 100-01, 337 A.2d 893, 901
(1975).
115. See, e.g., Keener v. Dayton Elect. Mfg., 445 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Mo. 1969).
116. See Kuziw v. Lake Eng'g Co., 586 F.2d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1978); Kavanaugh v.
Kavanaugh, 641 P.2d 258, 263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d
154, 165, 390 N.E.2d 859, 864 (1979); Olson v. A. W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d
530, 535 (N.D. 1977). See generally W. KB LE & R. LESHER, supra note 105, at
270-71 & n.39.
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misuse varies widely." 7 The misuse issue frequently arises in
"second impact" automobile collision cases. In these cases, the
plaintiff is suing, not for injuries from the initial collision, but for
aggravation of the initial injuries caused by the automobile's de-
sign in the "second collision" between the plaintiff and the auto-
mobile's interior. The courts have split on whether an automobile
collision is a "foreseeable misuse," requiring a manufacturer's de-
sign to safeguard the plaintiff from injuries suffered in "second
collision."" 8
The recognition of defenses often hinges upon how the plain-
tiff's conduct is characterized. Courts vary widely in their charac-
terization of particular misconduct. For example, automobile
manufacturers often seek to prove that the automobile operator in
a collision case was driving at an excessive speed or "under the
influence." Some courts have characterized such misconduct as
contributory negligence, and thus not a defense to strict liability
actions. Other courts, however, have characterized the same mis-
conduct as misuse or assumption of risk and have recognized the
defense."l 9
The precise applicability of assumption of risk is uncertain,
since it has been defined in different ways. 120 For example, states
differ over whether assumption of risk should be viewed objec-
tively or subjectively.121 Courts adhering to the subjective view re-
quire proof that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the danger
before voluntarily encountering it. At least four jurisdictions seem
to require proof that the plaintiff subjectively appreciated the risks
117. See generally P. SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTI-
TIONER 260 (1981).
118. Compare Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (al-
lowing recovery) with Evans v. General Motors Corp, 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.)
(barring recovery), cert denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). The Larsen view now
seems to be clearly the majority view. For a general discussion of the issue
and citation of authority, see R. HuRsH & H. BAILEY, 1 AMERICAN LAw OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 758 (2d ed. 1974); W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 105,
at 273, 280-85.
119. See W. KiMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 105, at 267; Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240,
258-60 (1972 & Supp. 1981).
120. See, e.g., Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 143 (Ala. 1976) (as-
sumption of risk may be asserted where "danger was either apparent to the
consumer or the seller adequately warned the consumer of the danger"); Cat-
erpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (assumption of risk
limited to conduct that demonstrates knowledge of the defect); Gangi v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 81, 84, 360 A.2d 907, 909 (1976) (assump-
tion of risk applicable where "a reasonable person ought to have compre-
hended the nature and the extent of the peril"). See generally S. BALDWIN, F.
HARE & F. McGovERN, THE PREPARATION OF A PRODUCT LIABILITY CASE 125-26
(1981).
121. See S. BALDWIN, F. HARE & F. McGovERN, supra note 120, at 125-26.
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involved.122 Each one of these states, however, describes this stan-
dard in a different way. In Colorado, the courts have held that as-
sumption of risk requires "knowledge of the specific dangers
arising out of the precise defects asserted."'123 The plaintiff, in
other words, must know exactly what risks he is taking in using a
particular product. Montana described the attributes of its subjec-
tive standard somewhat differently, requiring proof that the plain-
tiff not only realized the existence of a danger or defect and
voluntarily encountered it, but also that he appreciated the risk
(probability of harm) involved.124 Most states add the objective re-
quirement that the defendant prove that the plaintiff unreasonably
used the product, that is that the plaintiff was negligent. 2 5 The
variety of definitions means that the defendant will, depending on
where the case arises, have to meet a different burden of proof.
Thus, the defense is either very powerful or not readily
available. 26
Like the other defenses, the so-called "state of the art" defense
suffers from both a lack of definition and inconsistent application.
The defense is subject to considerable misunderstanding, since it
is not an affirmative defense in the usual sense. 27 The term "state
of the art" usually refers to at least two types of evidence: (1) the
knowledge available to the industry producing a certain product,
and (2) common production practices used in an industry.12 8
Courts in various jurisdictions have either accepted or rejected
such evidence when introduced by defendants to negate the plain-
tiffs proofs of defectiveness. Thus, if allowed, it provides a general
defense to the plaintiff's case in chief,129 but does not function in
the same fashion as an affirmative defense, such as the assumption
of the risk.
The current state of the law seems to be that, in unavoidably
unsafe product cases, or those dealing with the adequacy of warn-
122. See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Montana); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 170, 583 P.2d 276, 279
(1978); Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 100, 337 A.2d 893, 901
(1975); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979).
123. Culp v. Rexnord Booth-Rouse Equip. Co., 38 Colo. App. 1, 2, 553 P.2d 844, 845
(1976).
124. Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 111-12, 576 P.2d 711, 719-20 (1978)
(quoting Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.Supp. 753, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
125. See S. BALDWIN, F. HARE & F. McGOvERN, upra note 120, at 125-26.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 132.
128. J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY AND THE UNREASONABLE DANGEROUS RE-
QUIREMENT 393 (1981). The second type, merely adopting industry standards,
has been frowned upon since Judge Learned Hand's opinion in The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
129. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 128, at 393.
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ings, state of the art evidence is either admissible and conclu-
sive,130 or inadmissible.131 The basic rationale behind excluding
such evidence has been recently summarized by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,132
the defendants argued that it was unreasonable to impose a duty
to warn of unknowable risks.133 The court conceded that in negli-
gence cases failure to warn of an unknown risk is not unreasona-
ble.134 The court reasoned, however, that in a strict liability action,
the reasonability of the manufacturer's conduct was not at issue.
Rather, the court focused on the safety of the product without an
adequate warning. 3 5 Since consumers could not protect them-
selves without an adequate warning, the court concluded that the
basic policies behind strict liability136 required the defendant's
state of the art defense to be stricken.137
State legislatures have also entered the field, passing product
liability reform legislation that includes state of the art provi-
sions. 38 Without really defining the term "state of the art," these
state laws create either an affirmative defense, or a rebuttable pre-
sumption, that a product is free from defects if in compliance with
the state of the art at the time it was manufactured. 39 The current
state of the law, therefore, includes a mixture of common law doc-
trines and statutory provisions relating to state of the art, many of
which directly contradict one another.
A final example of uncertainty relating to defenses involves one
of the most widely discussed topics in product liability law in re-
cent years: the application of comparative negligence statutes or
comparative fault concepts to strict liability actions. A majority of
jurisdictions now subscribe to the comparative negligence doc-
trine, which essentially eliminates the absolute defense of contrib-
130. E.g., Tomer v. American Home Prods. Corp., 170 Conn. 681, 687, 368 A.2d 35, 38
(1976). See generally J. BEASLEY, supra note 128, at 403.
131. E.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 203, 447 A.2d at 546. Actually there is a difference between situations in
which a potential danger is not discoverable by present scientific methods,
and those in which the danger is known, but technology is not available at the
time of manufacture to prevent the danger. See P. SHERMAN, supra note 117,
at 267. The Beshada rationale against allowing state of the art evidence
would seem to apply to both situations in strict liability action.
134. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204, 447 A.2d 539, 546
(1982).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549.
137. Id. The Beshada court is obviously at odds with those courts that hold that
strict liability is indistinguishable from negligence in duty to warn cases. See
supra note 94.
138. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 128, at 408-09.
139. See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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utory negligence in negligence cases and considers the plaintiffs
misconduct only in mitigation of damages.140 Most states have ac-
complished the change to comparative negligence through legisla-
tion, although some states have adopted the doctrine judicially.14'
There are two basic types of comparative negligence. The first
is the so-called "pure" comparative negligence approach, generally
favored by the commentators. Under a "pure" comparative negli-
gence scheme, a plaintiff may recover regardless of his degree of
fault in relation to that of the defendant. Thus, a plaintiff who is
ninety-nine percent at fault can still recover one percent of his
damages from the defendant. 42 The second type is the "modified"
comparative negligence approach, which can itself be divided into
two major approaches. One version allows a negligent plaintiff to
recover proportionately, unless the plaintiff's degree of negligence
is greater than the defendant's. Under this variant, if the plaintiff's
degree of negligence is greater, he is completely barred from recov-
ery.143 A second version is slightly more restrictive and bars a
plaintiff from recovery if the plaintiff's negligence is equal to the
defendant's.144
The meshing of comparative negligence with strict liability has
caused considerable uncertainty and confusion. The basic prob-
lem is that most statutes speak of comparative negligence. Strict
liability, the argument goes, imposes liability on defendants re-
gardless of negligence, while comparative negligence necessarily
requires comparing the defendant's negligence with the plain-
tiff's.145 Thus, it is argued, it is incongruous to attempt to compare
negligence in strict liability cases, since the defendant need not be
negligent at all in order for the plaintiff to recover. Several courts
have accepted this argument, and have refused to apply compara-
tive negligence principles to strict liability.146 On the other hand,
140. See P. SHERMAN, supra note 117, at 251-52.
141. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1239, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 872 (1975); Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 434-38 (Fla. 1973). See generally Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M.
682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
142. E.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975). See generally P. SHERMAN, supra note 117, at 252.
143. E.g., MmN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
144. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (1979).
145. See P. SHERMAN, supra note 117, at 253-54.
146. See, e.g., Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 558, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976);
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974); Seay v.
Chrysler Corp, 93 Wash. 2d 319, 324, 609 P.2d 1382, 1384 (1980). See generally
Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 633, 638-41 (1981). The Massachusetts Supreme Court has
ruled recently that comparative fault is not a defense to a warranty claim,
which is "congruent in nearly all respects" with strict tort liability. Correia v.
The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 354, 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1039
(1983). But see Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 416 Mich. 558, 331 N.W.2d
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many courts have reached the opposite conclusion and have ap-
plied comparative negligence principles to strict liability, reason-
ing that fault can often be compared. Even these courts have
varied widely in their approach. Some have found their compara-
tive negligence statutes applicable to strict liability actions.147
Others have judicially applied comparative negligence principles
to strict liability actions.148 Finally, a few courts have applied com-
parative negligence principles to strict liability, but will not reduce
a plaintiffs recovery when the plaintiffs fault consists merely of
failing to discover or guard against product defects. 4 9 And, in
those states that apply comparative negligence principles to strict
liability actions, additional uncertainty is created because some
apply pure comparative negligence,150 while others use a modified
comparative negligence approach.' 5 '
Since comparative "negligence" is such an inappropriate label,
courts that apply comparative negligence principles to strict liabil-
ity now speak in terms of "comparative fault" or "comparative con-
456 (1982) (citing state statute incorporating comparative negligence princi-
ples in all product liability actions).
147. E.g., Sun Valley Airlines, Inc., v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho Law); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Baccelieri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351
(1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). See generally
Annot., supra note 146, at 641-48.
148. E.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978). California and Alaska are among the handful of states that have
judicially adopted comparative negligence. See supra note 141 and accompa-
nying text. Naturally, they also extended comparative negligence principles
to strict liability by judicial decision. However, in Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978), New Hampshire judicially applied
modified comparative negligence principles to strict liability cases, even
though the court held the state's comparative negligence statute by its terms
inapplicable to strict liability cases.
149. E.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Busch v. Busch
Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). See generally Annot., supra note
146, at 648-49 (1981).
150. This approach seems prevalent in states where courts judicially adopt com-
parative negligence in product liability actions, as opposed to applying a com-
parative negligence statute to strict liability actions. See Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). But see
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 808-10, 395 A.2d 843, 848-49
(1978) (state comparative negligence statute does not apply to strict liability
cases).
151. Of course, a state that applies a comparative negligence statute to strict lia-
bility actions will be constrained to utilize the form of comparative negli-
gence embodied in that statute-which is often modified comparative
negligence. See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150,
161, 406 A.2d 140, 144 (1979); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 10-11, 597 P.2d
351, 354 (1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 452, 155 N.W.2d 55, 56 (1976).
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tribution.' 52 This change in terminology is welcome, since it at
least recognizes that "negligence" is not involved.
The comparative fault cases provide an excellent example of
the uncertainty that currently exists in state product liability law.
First, the courts are widely divided on the question of whether to
apply the concept to strict liability cases at all. Second, when the
concept is applied, it is applied under varying formulas. A state's
comparative negligence law often dictates what form of compara-
tive fault will be applied, since courts will frequently simply apply
their comparative negligence statutory scheme to strict liability ac-
tions. The problem is that these statutes also vary widely, so the
confusion persists, at least at the national level. A state court may
also find a comparative negligence statute inapplicable to strict lia-
bility and yet adopt by judicial fiat a form of comparative fault for
product liability actions. The potential variations are endless and
the resulting confusion and uncertainty enormous.
E. Admissibility of "Subsequent Repairs" Evidence
The preceding subsections have outlined major areas of uncer-
tainty in the law of product liability. Countless minor differences
in product liability doctrine exist between the various jurisdic-
tions. One deserves special consideration because the courts have
reached such differing conclusions, and because the issue arises so
frequently in product liability trials. It is whether plaintiffs can in-
troduce evidence of "subsequent repairs."
The basic issue is whether plaintiffs in strict liability actions
may introduce evidence of subsequent safety improvements to es-
tablish that a product was defective when manufactured. 5 3 A ma-
jority of states154 appear to follow the policy of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,155 disallowing introduction of subsequent product re-
pairs or improvements in negligence actions.15 6 However, Federal
Rule 407, and similar state rules, speaks of "negligence or culpable
conduct,"157 and since the care or culpability of the manufacturer
is not part of the plaintiffs case in strict liability actions, some ju-
risdictions do not apply the exclusionary rule to strict liability ac-
152. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 CaL 3d 725, 735-36, 742, 575 P.2d 1162,
1167-68, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 385-86, 390 (1978).
153. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 9, 11 n.3 and cases cited therein.
154. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 2 WEiNSTEiN's EVIDENCE § 407(01) (1981).
155. The Rule states: "When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event .... " FED. R. Evm. 407.
156. E.g., Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, 375-76, 450 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616-17 (1982).
157. See, e.g., the text of FED. R. Evnw. 407, supra note 155.
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tions.158 These courts admit evidence of subsequent repairs when
offered to prove the existence of a defect as part of the plaintiff's
case in chief.159
California and New York, both leading jurisdictions in product
liability law, are proponents of this position. In Ault v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co. ,160 the California Supreme Court held that ev-
idence of subsequent design changes or modifications was
admissible to prove prior defects.161 The New York Court of Ap-
peals reached the same conclusion in Caprara v. Chrysler Corp.162
In Caprara, the court rejected the argument that admitting evi-
dence of subsequent repairs will deter manufacturers from making
their products safer.163 The court reasoned that certain aspects of
our economic system, such as mass marketing, insurance, and in-
creasing government regulation, all militate against any assump-
tion that manufacturers will refrain from product improvement
unless shielded by the evidence rule.164 In addition, both Ault and
Caprara noted that manufacturers' self-interest in avoiding future
litigation will encourage them to make improvements regardless of
the exclusionary rule.165
Other courts, however, take a different view, largely because of
public policy reasons. 16 6 These courts, contrary to Ault and
158. But see Grenada Steel Indus., Inc., v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th
Cir. 1983) (evidence of post-accident design changes properly excluded under
the federal rules, in addition to its lack of probative value and misleading
nature).
159. E.g., Cunningham v. Yazoo Mfg., 39 Ill. App. 3d 498, 500, 350 N.E.2d 514, 515
(1976); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 253 (S.D. 1976); Chart v.
General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 249, 254, 258 N.W.2d 680, 682 (1977).
160. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
161. Id. at 121, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
162. 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
163. Id. at 126, 417 N.E.2d at 550, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
164. Id. The Ault court took the same position:
When the context is transformed from a typical negligence setting to
be the modern products liability field, however, the "public policy"
assumptions justifying this evidentiary rule are no longer valid. The
contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal prod-
ucts liability defendant, manufactures tens of thousand of units of
goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will
forego making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable
additional law suits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public
image, simply because evidence adoption of such improvement may
be admitted in an action founded on strict liability for recovery on an
injury that preceded the improvement.
Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 121, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151-52,
117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1974).
165. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 121, 528 P.2d 1148, 1152, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1974); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 126, 417
N.E.2d 545, 550, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256 (1981).
166. See, e.g., Columbia v. Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892)
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Caprara, reason that admitting evidence of subsequent repairs de-
ters manufacturers from making product improvements, because
juries will conclude that such improvements are in effect an admis-
sion of a prior defect. These courts have determined that such evi-
dence is more prejudicial than probative,167 and have concluded
that these policy reasons mandate exclusion in strict liability ac-
tions as well as in negligence suits.168
Federal courts of appeal are split on the admissibility issue.169
Regardless of a particular circuit's position, however, a federal
court sitting in diversity may take a different position than the
state in which it is sitting, despite the Erie doctrine.170 This is so
because state rules of evidence may be considered procedural and
not binding on the federal court. For example, in Cann v. Ford Mo-
tor Co. ,171 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not fol-
low Caprara, but rather articulated its own view of the proper
rule.17
2
F. Overlaying Common Law Development With State Statutory Reform
Many states have adopted new product liability legislation
designed to reform the common law system. Although the merits
of the various statutes have been debated at length by the legal
(allowing admission of evidence of post-accident alteration and repair would
induce further negligence); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855-56 (4th
Cir. 1980) (bar against use post-accident precautionary measures protects
public; encourages product improvement without fear such precautions to be
used in lawsuit); Reddick v. White Consol. Indus., 295 F. Supp. 243, 247 (S.D.
Ga. 1968) (evidence of post-injury precautionary measures inadmissible; con-
trary to public policy); Mabe v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 145 W. Va.
712, 717, 116 S.E.2d 874, 877-78 (1960) (evidence of post-injury precautions not
to be construed as admission of guilt).
167. See generally Madden, Admissibility of Post-Incident Remedial Measures: A
Pattern Emerges, 5 J. PRODS. LAB. 1, 2-3, 9 (1982).
168. E.g., Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59-60 (2nd Cir. 1981) (Fed. R. Civ. P.
exclusion of evidence of post-accident precautions applicable in strict liabil-
ity actions); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980) (policy
rationale for barring evidence of subsequent precautionary measures to
prove negligence pertains equally to strict liability cases).
169. Compare Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 (8th Cir. 1977) (evidence of
subsequent modifications in strict liability actions not barred by Fed. R.
Evid.) with Vockie v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 1052 (3rd Cir. 1975) (re-
call order mandated by National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act not admitted
into evidence).
170. In Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court held that a federal
district court hearing a diversity case must apply the law of the state in which
the court is sitting. See infra note 399.
171. 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981).
172. Id. at 60. See generally L. Frumer, Recent Developments in Product Liability
Law, SMU PROD. LIAB. INST. 1-2, 1-3 (V. Walkowiak ed. 1982).
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community,173 no one has seriously suggested that these reforms
have led to certainty in the tort litigation system. The available
evidence suggests just the opposite: that state efforts have exacer-
bated the problem of uncertainty.174
First, there has been no general agreement as to which
problems require statutory solutions. Many differing legislative
approaches have been enacted. Probably the most popular reform
is the "statute of repose," adopted in at least twenty-two states. 75
A statute of repose is similar to a statute of limitations, but typi-
cally runs from the date of sale rather than from the time of injury
or from when the injury reasonably should have been discov-
ered. 7 6 Another statutory reform, adopted in at least seven
states, 7 7 creates a defense based upon modification or alteration
of a product by the consumer or user. Other reforms recognize de-
fenses if the product complied with the state of the art at the time
of manufacture 178 or with government safety regulations. Lesser
reforms include elimination or modification of the collateral source
rule, 7 9 elimination or limitation of ad damnum clauses in com-
plaints,180 and limitations on the introduction of evidence regard-
ing subsequent design change.181
Second, once a particular statutory solution is chosen there is
no agreement among the states as to the specific terms of the legis-
lation. The statutes of repose are an excellent example.182 These
173. See supra note 24.
174. See, e.g., Herrmann, An Overview of State Statutory Product Liability Law,
27 TRL,)A LAw. GUIDE 1, 3 (1983).
175. See Martin, A Statute of Respose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 745, 750 (1982).
176. See Comment, State Legislative Restrictions on Product Liability Actions, 29
MERCER L. REV. 621, 628 & nn.61-63. C.f. Bolick v. Am. Barmag Corp., 54 N.C.
App. 589, 594, 284 S.E.2d 188, 191-192 (1980) (legislative time bar to right to sue
must be statute of limitations, which begins to run when injury occurs, or
when injury reasonably ought to have been discovered). Others do not make
this semantical distinction. See Phillips, supra note 24; Note, supra note 31.
177. The seven states are: Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(b) (2) (Burns
Supp. 1983)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.320 (Baldwin 1979)); New
Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:3 (1983)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 28.01.1-07 (Supp. 1983)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 30.915 (1981));
Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-32 (Supp. 1982)); and Utah (UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-15-5 (1977)).
178. See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-520, 6-5-522 (Supp. 1982).
180. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.36 (West 1980) (limitation); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01.1-03 (Supp. 1983) (limitation).
181. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-686 (1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 27A.2946(3) (Supp. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-407 (1979).
182. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(a) (Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13.80-127.6(1) (b)
(Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(a) (West Supp. 1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b) (2) (Supp.
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vary widely in length, from six to twelve years.183 Some create a
rebuttable presumption that a product is not defective after pas-
sage of a certain number of years; others create an absolute de-
fense.184 Moreover, these statutes may or may not apply to actions
in negligence and warranty.185 If the statutes do not so apply, the
confusion presently surrounding multiple causes of actions and
the application of statutes of limitation to different theories of re-
covery in product cases will persist.186 One commentator suggests
that in cases with multistate contacts statutes of repose will proba-
bly become academic: choice of law rules will allow the plaintiff to
choose a forum with a more favorable traditional statute of limita-
tions.187 Finally, statutes of repose have been attacked as violating
state constitutions. 88 The net result "has been to exacerbate...
1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (a) (Supp. 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, § 213(b)
(1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3303(b) (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(2) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507-D:2(II) (a) (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 30-905(1) (1981); RI.L GEN. LAWS § 9-1-
13(b) (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977).
183. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (II) (A) (1983) (12 years after manu-
facturer parts with possession and control, or sold it, whichever occurred
last) with S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-2-21.1 (Supp. 1983) (six years after
delivery to first purchaser not a seller).
184. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(b) (3) (Supp. 1983) (presumption) and
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (1979) (presumption) with ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-683(1) (Supp. 1983) (absolute defense) and NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
21,182 (1979) (absolute defense).
185. See, e.g., IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1(3) (4) (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
186. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
187. Note, supra note 31, at 136-37. But see Traham v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 567 F.
Supp. 505 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). In Traham, the court ruled that the public pol-
icy of Tennessee favoring strict tort liability required choice of local law over
law of the state, where injury occurred when that state does not recognize
strict tort liability.
188. See, e.g., Pitts v. Unarco Ind., Inc., 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983) (Indiana statute
does not violate 14th amendment); Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg., 392 So. 2d
874 (Fla. 1980) (striking down Florida's 12-year statute of repose as violating
that state's constitutional provision guaranteeing access to the courts); Bo-
lick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C.App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), affid &
modified, 306 N.C. 364,293 S.E.2d 415 (1982) (court of appeals declared statute
unconstitutional; supreme court did not reach the issue); Kennedy v. Cum-
berland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.L 1984) (statute declared unconstitu-
tional); Layne v. The Langston Div. of Molins Mach. Co., 1982-83 PROD. LIAB.
REP. (CCH) 9207 (1981) (Tennessee statute declared unconstitutional). But
see Scalf v. Berkel, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (statute unconsti-
tutional). In Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983),
New Hampshire's 12-year statute of repose was declared unconstitutional.
The court gave several reasons for its decision: (1) the statute is inconsistent
with the state's constitutional guarantee of access to the courts; (2) the stat-
ute allows some suits to be nullified before they ever arise; (3) the repose
provision is not substantially related to a legitimate legislative objective since
the crisis in product liability had abated when the statute was enacted; and
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the wide disparity in legal principles which govern the outcome of
product liablity lawsuits depending upon the jurisdiction in which
they are brought."1 89 As a result, "[s] tate legislation of this sort is
liable to lead to a jungle of anomolous and complicating
provisions."19 0
Other types of legislative reform vary greatly from state to
state. For example, proof of compliance with the "state of the art"
establishes an absolute defense in some states,' 9 ' but only a pre-
sumption of lack of defect in others.192 Several only allow the de-
fendant to introduce evidence of compliance with the state of the
art.1 93 Likewise, product modification or alteration is an absolute
defense in some jurisdictions,194 but in others is considered a de-
fense only if the court determines that the particular modification
or alteration was not foreseeable.195 Regardless of the specific ap-
proach taken, minor variations of substance and phrasing in every
statute compound the uncertainty fostered by the basic dichoto-
mies. Insurers, manufacturers, and injured consumers-who
would take solace in increased certainty of product liabilty law-
will not find much comfort in the present state-by-state legislative
reforms.
III. EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE TORT LITIGATION
SYSTEM UPON INSURERS, MANUFACTURERS,
AND CONSUMERS
The current state created edifice of product liability uncertainty
(4) denial of equal protection. Id. at _ 464 A.2d at 295-99. See generally Note,
Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose: An Unconstitutional Denial of Access
to the Courts, 63 NEB. L. REV. 150 (1984).
189. Note, The Proposed Product Liability Statute in Ohio-Its Purpose and Prob-
able Results, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141, 145 (1980).
190. S. WADDAMS, PRODUCTS LIABrLTY 252 (1980). Prof. Schwartz has observed
that "state legislation appears to have fueled uncertainty. Although the 17
state laws that have been enacted deal with a number of similar general top-
ics such as statutes of limitations, they vary in important details." Schwartz,
supra note 10, at 585.
191. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (Supp. 1983); Ind. CODE ANN. § 34-4-
20A-4(4) (Burns Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (1979).
192. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(a) (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT § 411.310(2)
(1979).
193. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2805 (Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600-
2945 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105 (1980).
194. E.g., Ky. REV. STATS. § 411.320(1) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 507-D3 (Supp.
1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-04 (Supp.
1981); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-32 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-5 (1977).
195. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-681(2) (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572
(Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(3) (Burns Supp. 1982); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30-915 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 20-9-10 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-108 (1980).
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is not imposing per se. A departure from the present state-by-state
approach to product liability would be warranted only if these un-
certainties impose unnecessary burdens on affected groups. The
purpose of this section of this Article is to argue that such unnec-
essary burdens have, in fact, resulted.
Any discussion of the effects of product liability uncertainty
upon the three most affected groups-insurers, manufacturers,
and consumers-can hardly be definitive, since the boundaries of
uncertainty are not susceptible to rigid definition. Furthermore,
misinformation about product liability law is rampant and uncer-
tainty exacts psychological as well as financial costs. Accordingly,
the full costs that uncertainty exacts on insurers, manufacturers,
and consumers are impossible to calculate.
However, an examination of the effects of uncertainty can have
considerable value since the basic problems of each group are the
same nationwide. Many products are marketed or advertised on a
national basis. Even where a particular product is not marketed
nationally, chances are very high that the product will be sold in at
least several states. 9 6 In response, product liability insurance
rates are set on the basis of national experience. 197 What distin-
guishes product liability law from other areas, therefore, is that the
state of the law leaves no insurer, manufacturer, or consumer unaf-
fected. Due to the inherently national effects of product liability
law, this area appears especially ill-suited for piecemeal, state-by-
state development. 98 Since product liability law has generally fol-
lowed the path of the common law, however, it is appropriate to
weigh the present system's impact on insurers, manufacturers
(and other sellers), and consumers.
A. Uncertainty And Its Effect on Product Liability Insurers and
Insurance Buyers
Before discussing the impact of uncertainty on product liability
insurance, two preliminary matters require consideration. The
first is a recognition of the primary importance of insurance in the
product liability field. Product liability insurance is a mechanism
for transferring risk from one party (the manufacturer or business-
196. See, e.g., F NAL REPORT, supra note 14, at xliv; BRIEFING REPoRT, supra note
14, at 19.
197. See infra note 198 & notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
198. This national impact is what distinguishes product liability from other areas
of the law in which insurance crises have developed. Product liability rates
are based on national experience, not individual state experience. Unlike the
situation with medical malpractice, for example, where a doctor's practice is
likely to be confined to one state, products may give rise to claims anywhere.
See INsuRA c E SrUny, supra note 14, at 4-89.
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man) to another (the insurer)199 and distributing that risk among
the other policyholders and, ultimately, to the consumer. Thus
what the insurer does in the nature of ratemaking or underwriting
decisions200 necessarily impacts both manufacturers and product
liability claimants. If the manufacturer or businessman has insur-
ance, that fact will have a bearing on whether a claimant will settle
or sue. On the other hand, if the manufacturer or businessman has
no insurance, the claimant may be precluded from recovery if the
manufactuer or businessman has inadequate resources to pay the
judgment.201
A second important preliminary matter concerns the question
of whether insurers have created their own insurance-related
product liability problems. For example, the Federal Interagency
Task Force listed insurance ratemaking practices as one of the
three principal causes of product liability problems. 20 2 Moreover,
product liability insurance has traditionally been written as part of
a comprehensive policy covering other aspects of a manufacturer's
or business's insurance needs.203 This has made it difficult to ob-
tain adequate information concerning, among other things, the
profitability of product liability insurance.2 04 Because of this pau-
city of reliabile information, insurers have recently attempted to
segregate product liability data from the general business policies
199. See, e.g., In re Smiley's Estate, 35 Wash. 2d 863, 867, 216 P.2d 212, 214 (1950):
"A contract may be a risk shifting device, but to be a contract of insurance,
which is a risk-distributing device, it must possess both features, and unless
it does it is not a contract of insurance whatever be its name or its form."
200. Underwriting and ratemaking are related, but should be distinguished. For
the purposes of this Article, underwriting is specific, while ratemaking is gen-
eral: "Underwriting by insurance companies is a procedure to determine
whether or not a company will accept a risk. Rate making involves determin-
ing a premium which is to be paid by a risk that has been accepted." GA. LEG.
REP., supra note 27, at 8. Rates are established forproduct classifications are
expressed in terms of the level of sales by a firm. FINAL REPORT, supra note
14, at VI-17. Thus, a given company's premium, in the most general terms and
before any adjustments, will be established by the rate for a given product
classification applied to that company's level of sales.
201. Although the Task Force did not find a single case in which a manufacturer
was unable to respond to an adverse product liablity judgment, it recognized
that the possibility exists. FNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-34, VII-190. A
recent survey by a small business concern indicates that 3 percent of its
members have "gone bare"-i.e., without product liability insurance. Id. at
VI-34. This indicates that some businesses may be unable to respond to a
series of adverse product judgments. Id. at VI-35. At any rate, such a situa-
tion might affect a consumer's decision about who to sue in the chain of dis-
tribution-manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer-since all of these parties
are often amenable to suit. Cf. id. at VII-190.
202. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
203. INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at ES-3, 1-6, 1-8.
204. Id. at 1-6, 4-52.
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and to gather more complete information about ratemaking for
product liability insurance.2 05
Some have suggested that, with improved information about
product liability insurance, better ratemaking procedures, and re-
forms such as the Risk Retention Act,206 tort reform can be dis-
pensed with as a necessary component in the resolution of product
liability problems. 207 This position is untenable. First, the Task
Force did not rank the three principal causes of the product liabil-
ity problem in order of importance. Rather, it noted a tendency for
the various interests represented to blame each other as the "true"
principal cause.208 Insurers and manufacturers pointed to uncer-
tainty in the tort litigation system, while the plaintiffs bar pointed
to inadequacies in insurance ratemaking practices. 209 Thus, it is
not surprising that some might urge a single solution. Second, the
Task Force itself concluded that all principal causes of the product
liability problem must be addressed to find an adequate
solution.2 10
While these generic responses adequately answer the argu-
ment that improved ratemaking procedures alone will solve the
product liability problem, there are more specific reasons why
ratemaking changes along will not suffice. First, a problem of per-
ception exists.211 Insurers perceive the uncertainty in the tort liti-
gation system to be the primary problem in the product liability
area,2 12 and, considering the shifting sands of product liability de-
205. See, e.g., id. at 4-53 & 54. It has been suggested that these reforms will aid
ratemaking. Id. See also id. at 1-3.
206. Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949 (1981).
207. For example, it has been argued that: "It may well be that all that is needed
are changes in how risks are insured rather than changes in the risks them-
selves. At the very least, measures like the Risk Retention Act should be
given a chance to work before tampering with the delicate mechanism of tort
law." Ribstein, The Model Uniform Product Liability Act: Pinning Down
Products Law, 46 J. Am L. & COM. 349, 355 (1981).
208. FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at xxxix, 1-20.
209. Id. at xxxix & 1-21. See also Schwartz, supra note 10, at 578.
210. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-21.
211. The vice president of one insurer, John. F. O'Sullivan, has noted the problem
of perception. Observing that there is little meaningful data available about
product liability claims and exposures, he remarked that: "Under the circum-
stances it is possible that those involved in determining rates for products
liability insurance are strongly influenced by isolated unreasonable deci-
sions." Nat'l Underwriter, Jan. 6, 1978, at 19. O'Sullivan further observed that:
"[I]t's possible that existing products liability law is not as significant a con-
tributing factor to the unavailability or unaffordability of products liability
insurance as in perception of the trend in the law." Id. (emphasis added).
212. See, e.g., INsU-mACE STuDY, supra note 14, at 4-88:
A central theme emerging from our interviews with insurance execu-
tives in analysis of underwriting files is that to the extent there is a
crisis in products liability insurance, it has been caused less by
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velopment, such a perception may be valid. Professor Schwartz
has noted: "[E]ven if insurers substantially improve their
ratemaking practices, underwriters would be in a very poor posi-
tion to predict the consequences of an individual product risk. The
uncertainty inherent in the tort litigation system could justify very
conservative rate setting."2 13 Second, some of the other options,
such as risk retention, work best in a stable legal environment. 214
Finally, just as some have argued that insurance reform alone is
the answer,21 5 others have suggested that tort reform can elimi-
nate the need for reform in insurance practices. 216 In all likeli-
hood, all causes should be addressed.
1. The Nature of Product Liability Insurance Ratemaking
and Underwriting
In order to comprehend the specific effects of uncertainty in the
known increases in claims costs than by high and increasing uncer-
tainty about future suits and settlements. Increasing costs and re-
sulting losses are occasionally cited as reasons for rate increases or
coverage denials, but poor underwriting results have plagued other
lines of insurance during the past 2 years without creating the "cri-
sis" atmosphere surrounding product liability.
213. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 584. Schwartz is quoted to similar effect in Nat'l
Underwriter, Nov. 2, 1979, at 8: "As long as courts can retroactively create
new and unprecedented product liability law, the specter of future products
liability crises will continue." Other sources have reached the same
conclusion:
Assuming there were improvements in insurance rate-making prac-
tices and in product liability loss prevention, uncertainties in the
substantive rules governing the tort-litigation system could serve as
justification for continuous adjustments in product liability rates.
Thus, insurers stress that in light of the current legal climate, past
data are not a reliable source for rate making.
WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF, PRODUCT LIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW,
RESEARCH BULLETIN 78-3, at 9 (1978) (emphasis in original).
214. Risk retention is self insurance. It is especially effective when "the loss costs
involved are relatively predictable from period to period and when the retain-
ing organization has the necessary financial and administrative resources to
cover the losses effectively and efficiently." INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14,
at 3-20. Risk retention has thus far been used primarily to cover propery
risks. Id.
215. One can also argue that state insurance regulation can control product liabil-
ity insurance rates. There are at least two problems with this position. First,
in 30 percent of the states rates are not subject to prior approval by the state
insurance commission. INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 2-16. Second, be-
cause of the inherently judgmental nature of determining present liability
insurance rates, see infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text, state regula-
tors have generally gone along with product liability rate changes imple-
mented by insurers. INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 1-2, 1-3, 1-37. See
also FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at V-12.
216. 4 LEGAL STUDY, supra note 14, at 18. Cf. INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 4-
18.
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tort litigation system on the insurance industry, it is important to
first develop a basic understanding of the nature of product liabil-
ity insurance ratemaking and underwriting procedures. 2 17 The
first major point is that product liability rates and premiums are
based on highly judgmental considerations. The ratemaking arm
of the insurance industry often speaks of two types of rates for dif-
fering product classifications. The first is the so-called "manual"
rate, which is usually applied to low risk products produced by
small firms. 2 18 This type of rate is actuarially determined, that is,
it is a rate for product classes for which there are sufficient data
and experience to determine statistically the risk upon which to
base the premium. 2 19 The second type of rate is for so-called "(a)
rated" products classifications. The (a) rated classifications in-
volve products for which there is insufficient data and experience
to determine the risk. As a result, the ratemaking arm of the insur-
ance industry has developed suggested rates for (a) rated prod-
ucts, but these rates are only guidelines, and are completely
subject to the judgment of the underwriter.220
While most product classifications are manually rated,22 1
eighty-five to ninety percent of the exposures to product liability
risks are for products that are not so rated.222 Thus, the vast ma-
jority of product liability risks involve products for which the un-
derwriters' judgment determines the premium. Even if a product
is manually rated, it is not immune from the judgment of an under-
writer. In deciding whether to accept a particular risk, the under-
writer will often subject even a manually rated product premium
to some judgmental factors.223 Thus, the final product liability pre-
mium any manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer pays is heavily in-
fluenced by judgmental considerations.
217. In the product liability field at least, the ratemaking arm of the insurance
industry is the Insurance Services Office (ISO). FINAL REPORT, supra note 14,
at V-9.
218. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at V-10.
219. See INSURANCE STuoY, supra note 14, at 1-36; FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at
V-10.
220. INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 1-36; FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at V-11.
221. Sixty-seven percent of ISO product classifications are manually rated. INsUR-
ANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 1-36; FINAL REPORT, .supra note 14, at V-10 (indi-
cating 65-75 percent of product classifications are manually rated).
222. Eighty-five to ninety percent of premium dollars are spent on product classifi-
cations that are not manually rated. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at V-10.
See also GA. LEGIS. REP., supra note 27, at 10-11. Premium dollars should
reflect exposure to risk, but, of course, the accuracy of such a reflections in
the products liability area is open to question. This Article assumes a rough
correlation.
223. See, e.g., INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 1-38: "Even for manually rated
classifications, where the basic rate is based on aggregate experience, some
judgment may be involved in selecting the appropriate classification."
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The second major point is that product liability rates are based
on national, not statewide, experience.224 The most likely reason
for this is that most products are marketed on a national basis and
suits may arise in any jurisdiction.225 Moreover, as has been indi-
cated,226 it is unlikely that state insurance regulation can control
product liability insurance rates.
These two factors-that product liability rates and premiums
are heavily dependent upon an underwriter's judgment, and that
product liability rates are based on national experience-combine
to link rates and premiums to uncertainty in the tort litigation
system.
Because product liability rates and premiums are so heavily in-
fluenced by judgmental considerations, extreme cases have a dis-
proportionate influence on ratemaking and underwriting decisions.
Since products are marketed on a national basis and rates are set
on the basis of national experience, the influence of the so-called
"worst case" is limited not to the most extreme case within one
jurisdiction, but to the most extreme case in any jurisdiction.227
Thus, the conservative judicial decisions of one jurisdiction will
have little effect on the product liability rates and premiums
charged within that jurisdiction. Rather, these charges will be in-
fluenced by changing judicial interpretations in the "most liberal"
jurisdiction.228
All of this would be meaningless if there were no real impact on
224. GA. LEGIS. REP., supra note 27, at 13; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 9.
225. See, e.g., the remarks of Mr. Grover Czech of the American Insurance Associ-
ation, quoted in Nat'l Underwriter, Aug. 17, 1979, at 6.
226. See supra note 215.
227. The LEGAL STUDY observed: "[I]nsurers tend to establish premium rates on
the basis of the broadest possible theory of liability which has been adopted
in any jurisdiction." 4 LEGAL STuDY, supra note 14, at 70. The Georgia Legis-
lative Report commented: "As isolated and wrongly decided cases are
presented, fear of these decisions can likely cause underwriters to reevaluate
premiums as well as loss reserve estimates." GA. LEGIS. REP., supra note 27,
at 11.
228. Observing that product liability rates and premiums are based on the experi-
ence of other jurisdictions, the Georgia Legislative Report noted two effects:
First, the conservatism of the Georgia courts is of little or no benefit
to those manufacturers that are domiciled in Georgia or whose prod-
ucts are distributed primarily in Georgia. Second, the impact of any
legislative changes in Georgia will be minimal or nonexistent unless
those states which are significantly contributing to the product liabil-
ity problem also enact legislation.
GA. LEGIS. REP., supra note 27, at 13. Similar concerns were expressed by
Grover Czech of the American Insurance Association: "Because of [products
liability rates reflecting national experience], if [the Pennsylvania tort re-
form level] were to be enacted tomorrow in the state of Pennsylvania, there
would be no specific and immediate impact on product liability cases." Nat'l
Underwriter, August 17, 1979 at 6.
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the final insurance product. That, however, is not the case. The
impact of uncertainty in the tort litigation system on product liabil-
ity insurance has been felt in three major areas: unavailability of
insurance, partial unavailability of insurance, and the increased
cost of insurance.
2. Unavailability of Product Liability Insurance
When news of the product liability crisis first received national
attention during the period from 1974 to 1976, many manufacturers
asserted that they were being forced to "go bare"; that is, forced to
go without product liability insurance. The available evidence in-
dicates that this concern was overstated. Any availability problem
has been largely confined to smaller firms or to firms in particular
product areas.
One of the reasons for this tendency to "overstate the case"
might relate to the inherent difficulties in measuring the extent of
any availability problem. A fundamental difficulty is defining the
term "unavailable."229 Insurance may be deemed by some to be
"unavailable" for reasons other than the defects in tort litigation
system. First, it is difficult to measure how diligent a given firm
may have been in seeking an insurance quotation.230 Second,
some firms may be unable to secure a quotation because they pro-
duce unsafe products and have a poor claims record. Insurance
that is unavailable for such reasons might be termed "legiti-
mately" unavailable.2 31 Third, some manufacturers might assert
that there is an availability problem when their insurance costs
have significantly increased. Insurance in such instances is still
available, however, if the manufacturers are willing to pay the
price.232 On the other hand, at some point the affordability prob-
lem necessarily becomes an availability problem if the manufac-
turer really cannot afford to carry any insurance.233 Indeed, some
firms may understate the problem for fear that reporting they are
"going bare" may jeopardize their relationships with customers.234
Generally, the availability problem is not serious. The Task
Force's insurance contractor could identify only sixty-two compa-
229. The Task Force developed this definition: "Product liability insurance is un-
available to a firm when, after a thorough search of the insurance market,
that firm is unable to obtain a quotation for products coverage which effects a
reasonable transfer to risks from the insured to the insurer." FINAL REPORT,
supra note 14, at VI-2. Of course, what a reasonable transfer of risk is re-
mains problematical.
230. See id. at VI-3.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 3-4.
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nies that previously had coverage but were now "going bare."235
This figure included firms going without insurance because they
felt they were unable to afford it.236 The Task Force's Industry
Study found that eighty-six percent of the firms in its telephone
survey carried insurance, but of those firms that did not carry in-
surance, only four were not able to obtain insurance at any
price.23 7 Similarly, an industry survey of small manufacturers
found that only 2.1 percent of firms going without coverage were
unable to find any willing carrier.238 Other industry surveys have
also failed to reveal a widespread availability problem.2 39 Finally,
state insurance commissioners also indicated to the Task Force
that they did not feel that there is a widespread availability
problem.24 0
Where there is an availability problem, it tends to exist only for
smaller firms. 24 1 There are three reasons for this: (1) larger com-
panies pay greater premiums to insurers, and have greater lever-
age over them; (2) the larger companies have the financial and
administrative capability to solve insurance problems internally
through such devices as risk retention; and (3) larger companies
often have a greater product mix. 242
Also suffering from availability problems are the manufacturers
of durable products, such as industrial machinery. The problem
here is that these companies manufacture products with a life ex-
pectancy of ten to twenty years. After a company has been in busi-
ness for twenty years its exposure to potential liability may
amount to a thousand times the value of the current year's produc-
tion.243 In such a situation, older firms may be unable to pass
along the insurance cost to consumers, since it must compete in a
market with newer firms that do not yet have a "long tail" problem
and do not have to reflect the older firms' higher insurance costs in
235. Id.
236. Id. at ES-5, 3-2. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VIA.
237. INSUJRANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at ES-5, 3-2. See also FINAL REPORT, supra
note 14, at VIA.
238. Fn'AL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-5 (survey of National Federation of In-
dependent Business involving 1,296 responses to 4,214 questionnaires
mailed).
239. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-6. See also INSURANCE STUDY,
supra note 14, at 3-9.
240. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at V-6, V-7.
241. See INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 3-2, 3-23.
242. Id. at 3-24. Greater product mix, for example, allows firms to spread the effect
of rate increases to safer product lines, and to offer an attractive overall pack-
age to the insurer. See id. at 3-23, 3-24. See also id. at ES-3.
243. Id. at ES-5. This does not necessarily imply that older products present a
significant overall product liability problem.
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the price of their product.244
3. Partial Unavailability of Products Liability Insurance
Unavailability problems are not limited to instances where a
company is unable to obtain any insurance. They also include sit-
uations where a firm cannot obtain adequate product liability in-
surance. This latter situation might be termed one of partial
unavailability, and would include restrictions on policy limits, in-
creased deductibles, or restricted coverage on certain products. 245
While the evidence in this area is conflicting, it does suggest that
there is a partial unavailability problem.
On the one hand, the Task Force's Insurance Study down-
244. See infra notes 350-51 and accompanying text. The overall availability prob-
lem is probably best summarized by the conclusions of the FnVAL REPORT,
There is no widespread problem of product liability insurance being
unavailable. A few companies in our target industries and other
high-risk product lines are having difficulty obtaining product liabil-
ity insurance. For some others, product liability rates would appear
to be unaffordable - it has been persuasively argued to the Task
Force that this is the practical equivalent of unavailability.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-52. The eight target industries studied by
the Task Force were: industrial machinery; industrial grinding wheels; fer-
rous and non-ferrous metal castings; industrial chemicals; aircraft compo-
nents; automotive components related to safe vehicle operation; medical
devices and pharmaceuticals; and power lawnmowers. Id. at 1-6, 1-7.
While there is no reason to doubt the Task Force findings, reports to the
contrary do circulate. For example, Robert Taft, Jr., counsel for the Special
Committee for Workplace Product Liability Reform, a group of trade associa-
tions, testified that:
The number of companies that are going bare without product liabil-
ity [coverage] is a frightening example of the "American roulette"
that has resulted from the product liability insurance crisis. Due to
this lack of affordability and/or availability and large deductibles,
1978 surveys revealed that 35 percent of the American Textile Ma-
chinery Association Members and one-fifth of the members of the
National Machine Tool Builders Association have gone without prod-
uct liability insurance at all, each risking bankruptcy should a large
judgment be entered against it and providing little incentive for
keeping or expanding capital investment in the business.
R. Taft, Jr., Testimony on behalf of Special Committee for Product Liability
Reform, before Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation 3
(Apr. 22, 1980). While the testimony is significant, its impact is unclear. First,
the quoted material could indicate more of an affordability problem than an
availability problem. Second, the testimony relates only to certain types of
manufacturers; thus it is questionable whether it is indicative of an overall
availability problem. Third, the statistics regarding the NIMBA involve par-
tial unavailability problems, and so do not clearly indicate the impact of the
partial availability problems.
On the other hand, when substantial percentage of any group of manufac-
turers go without insurance, one must conclude that availability problems for
certain manufacturers in certain industries are quite severe.
245. See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-7.
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played partial unavailability problems. After reviewing 3,000 un-
derwriting files, the Insurance Study found that deductibles were
used in only three percent of the cases.246 The Insurance Study
concluded that "although insurers are imposing some limitations
on coverage, such as higher deductibles and reduced coverage lim-
its, these practices are not common."247 The Study listed two rea-
sons why coverage restrictions are used infrequently: first, by
restricting coverage, an insurer subjects an insured to a serious fi-
nancial risk, which tends to foster a poor relationship between the
two parties; second, a policy holder can usually find another in-
surer willing to provide the coverage for some premium.248 Thus,
the Insurance Study concluded that coverage restrictions are
rarely used because they are simply bad business. 249 The Study
did, however, indicate that there is a "somewhat greater tendency"
for underwriters to not raise liability limits on existing policies,
and that underwriters are becoming "more selective" in the prod-
uct liability field.250 On this basis, the Final Report concluded
that-because some manufacturers' risk exposure to product lia-
bility claims is increasing, due to trends in the law, increased sales,
new product development, or merely inflation-they may be un-
able to raise the limits251 of their product liability insurance cover-
age to deal with these risks.252
Unlike the Insurance Study, the Task Force Industry Study
found that a significant percentage of respondents to its telephone
survey reported coverage restrictions.253 Restrictions imposed by
companies included limiting coverage to products currently pro-
duced, excluding certain products from coverage, or limiting the
amount to be expended on defense costs. 254 Ten percent of the
respondents reported that some of their products were excluded
from coverage, and nine and one-half percent reported other re-
strictions, such as excluding new products or including defense
costs within policy limits. 255 Similarly, testimony of insurance
companies before congressional committees indicates that some
companies do automatically exclude certain product categories
246. See INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 3-12.
247. Id. at 3-2.
248. Id. at 3-12.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. There are occurrence limits (limits to be paid on any one claim) and annual
aggregate limits (total limits on all occurrences during any one policy year).
FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-8.
252. Id.
253. 1 INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 14, at IV-41 & Table IV-18. See also FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at VI-9.
254. 1 INrDusTRY STUDY, supra note 14, at IV-41.
255. Id.
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from coverage.25 6
Probably the most significant disparity between the Task Force
contractors regarding partial unavailability is reflected in their
findings regarding deductibles. The Insurance Study found that
only three percent of the underwriting files that it reviewed con-
tained deductibles.257 The Industry Study, however, discovered
that forty-one percent of the firms it surveyed had some form of
deductible, a figure that represented a sharp increase in frequency
since 1975.258
The Industry Study also found that the size of the average de-
ductible increased significantly between 1975 and 1976 for both
large and medium-sized firms, but had decreased slightly for
smaller firmS.25 9 Similarly, a survey by the National Machine Tool
Builders Association (NMTBA) found that twenty-three percent of
the sixty firms it surveyed had deductibles, and that forty percent
of the fifteen metal-forming companies surveyed had deduct-
ibles. 260 In addition, the NMTBA survey showed a significant in-
crease in the size of deductibles from 1975 to 1976.261 These results
might be explained partially by greater use of voluntary risk reten-
tion, especially by larger firms. 262 However, even if risk retention,
through the more frequent use of larger deductibles, is voluntary,
it represents a significant effect of uncertainty in the tort litigation
system, as it indicates a business decision to bear a risk that previ-
ously would have been transferred through the insurance
mechanism.
In conclusion, uncertainty in the tort litigation system has led
to a partial unavailability problem for some firms. Insurers have
become reluctant to raise coverage limits for existing policyhold-
ers, thus ultimately exposing those policyholders to increased
risks. Some firms must cope with restrictions imposed by their in-
surers that exclude certain existing or new products, from cover-
age. The most clearly documented partial unavailability problem
manifests itself through the more frequent use of deductibles and
the use of larger deductibles. While the use of deductibles in some
cases may be voluntary, it indicates that manufacturers and busi-
256. Id.
257. FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-21.
258. Id. at VI-11.
259. The average deductible increased 61 percent to $335,000 between 1975 and
1976 for large firms, 258 percent to $120,000 for medium-sized firms, and de-
creased 17 percent to $7,400 for small firms. Id at VI-11; INDUSTRY STUDY,
supra note 14, at IV-37 & Table rV-15.
260. See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-10.
261. Id.
262. See id. at VI-53. See also INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 3-21, 3-22.
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nessmen must now bear risks for which they previously would
have been able to obtain coverage.
4. The Affordability of Product Liability Insurance
The Task Force Briefing Report found that the product liability
insurance problem was primarily one of cost rather than availabil-
ity.2 6 3 One of the principal difficulties in discussing the af-
fordability of product liability insurance, however, comes in trying
to put the figures into perspective. Manufacturers and insurers
pushing for tort reform often point to increases in premiums rang-
ing from five-hundred percent to several thousand percent. Plain-
tiffs' attorneys, and other opponents of tort reform, counter by
noting that product liability premiums seldom amount to more
than one percent of total sales. However, looking at such figures in
isolation and without elaboration is misleading, and fails to give
consideration to the underlying facts. Pointing to a percentage in-
crease in the price of premiums only indicates that premiums cost
more, not that they are unaffordable or unjustified.26 4 Conversely,
viewing a premium only as a percentage of sales ignores the fact
that most profitable businesses make a profit amounting to only a
small percentage of sales, and thus underemphasizes the impact of
large increases in product liability premiums. The Final Report of
the Task Force offers this cogent explanation:
[A] n increase in a firm's product liability insurance premium of several
hundred percent in one year may not be unaffordable if the previous
year's premium was less than a tenth of a percent of sales. On the other
hand, an increase in the ratio of current premium to sales (expressed as a
percentage from 0.1% to 0.35% may be unaffordable to a firm which cannot
pass on increased costs and which has a net profit margin of 1.0% of sales.
The increase in premium to 0.35% of sales could be unaffordable if that
firm cannot withstand a reduction of pre-tax profits by one fourth.
2 6 5
With these limitations, the data does point to a significant cost
problem in the product liability insurance area.
The Insurance Study found that product liability insurance
rates had increased significantly, especially from 1974 to 1976. For
example, in its review of underwriting files, the Insurance Study
found that rate increases in the target product categories ranged
from 19 percent to 568 percent since 1974. For other rated products
the average increase was 251 percent.266 Furthermore, data col-
lected by the Task Force indicate a significant increase in product
263. BRIEFING REPORT, supra note 14, at 6.
264. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-12, VI-13.
265. Id. at VI-12, VI-13 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
266. INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 14, at 2-20. The caveats to these figures, id.,
should, however, be examined. See also FmNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-
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liability premiums. The Industry Study found an average increase
of 280 percent in premiums paid per thousand dollars for the 1971
through 1976 period. The average premium increased 384 percent
for small firms, 2 6 7 and certain product classifications, such as medi-
cal devices and pharmaceuticals, reported especially large in-
creases, 388 percent and 613 percent, respectively.268 Other
evidence received by the Task Force reveals more extreme cases
not reflected by the averages. For example, one industrial machin-
ery manufacturing company reported a premium increase of over
1,800 percent in one year.269 Letters provided to the Task Force by
a legislative committee also indicated that premium increases
ranged up to 7,200 percent.2 70
To reiterate, the cost problem has been particularly acute in
smaller firms. This problem is reflected not only in proportionally
greater increases in premiums, but also in the fact that smaller
firms are less able to cope effectively with cost increases. 271 There
are several reasons for this. Small companies may be unable to
retain risks through large deductibles, and may have a narrower
product mix, which makes it difficult to spread the premium be-
tween low-risk and high-risk products.272 Moreover, insurance
companies are less likely to credit smaller firms with a good safety
record with reduced premiums. By contrast, the insurance compa-
nies may be more willing to "hold the line" for large firms because
of the larger premiums they produce, or because providing cover-
age for other portions of a larger firm's insurance needs makes for
a generally attractive insurance package,273 despite potential prod-
uct liability problems.
In summary, despite the inherent difficulties in evaluating data
regarding product liability insurance costs, there has been a sub-
stantial increase in the cost of product liability insurance, espe-
cially for smaller firms and manufacturers of high-risk products.
Although product liability insurance premiums have meliorated
somewhat in the early 1980'S,274 the cost of insurance will continue
267. See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-18.
268. Id. at VI-19.
269. Id. at VI-22.
270. Id. at VI-22, VI-23.
271. See id. at VI-24.
272. See id. at VI-25, VI-26.
273. See id. at VI-26, VI-27.
274. See Bus. INs., Jan. 10, 1983, at 22. A principal reason for this melioration is
that insurers have been enjoying "higher than normal" returns on investment
income as the economy surges and can thus engage in premium competition.
Bus. INs., Aug. 16, 1982, at 13. Such competition is unlikely to last long, how-
ever, if product liability underwriting losses continue. By the end of 1982,
insurers were paying out $1.27 in product liability losses for every dollar of
premiums received. Bus. INs., Apr. 18, 1983, at 27.
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to rise in our unstable legal environment where a premium is
based upon the worst possible case from any jurisdiction.275 Prod-
uct liability insurance costs or unavailability have, as of yet, ban-
krupted few firms, but the real issue is whether such costs on
business and consumers is justified when a more certain system of
federal law is possible.
B. Uncertainty and Its Effect on Manufacturers
Manufacturers have felt the expansion of and constant flux in
product liability law in a number of ways. In addition to the insur-
ance availability and affordability problems, 276 the most pervasive
inequity from the manufacturer's perspective is that any one prod-
uct is subject to legal standards which vary widely from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. 27 7  This uncertainty regarding legal
standards278 has had four major impacts on the manufacturer: (1)
the psychological costs of uncertainty; (2) the impact of uncer-
tainty on doing business; (3) the effect of uncertainty on business
failures; and (4) the effect of uncertainty on loss prevention
programs.
1. The Psychological Costs of Uncertainty
The psychological effects of uncertainty caused by the tort liti-
gation system on manufacturers and insurers are very real. For
example, manufacturers often perceive product liability problems
to be worse than they really are because a grapevine carrying lia-
bility horror stories has developed, spreading vast amounts of mis-
information.27 9 Manufacturers, like insurers, react to the most
extreme cases decided in any single jurisdiction.28 0 Although the
275. The Insurance Study noted that:
Since judgment is a major factor in determining rates, and since an
underwriter must exercise this judgment in a highly uncertain tort
litigation element ... rates will probably continue to increase,
though at a more modest pace, unless there is discernable evidence
that the trend toward absolute liability and overly generous product
liability awards is halted.
INSURANCE STuDy, supra note 14, at ES-4.
The trend toward generous awards has not diminished, however. For in-
stance, in California between 1981 and 1982, average jury awards rose 51 per-
cent. Bus. INS., Mar. 28, 1983, at 48.
276. Of course, availability and affordability problems can also affect wholesalers
and retailers, who can also be held liable in product liability suits.
277. The practical impact of such fears was demonstrated in the recent swine flu
experience. See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
278. According to Professor Birnbaum: "Manufacturers are fearful because they
don't know what to do. They don't know what standards to follow when they
make their goods." U.S. NEWS & WoR.D REP., June 14, 1982, at 62.
279. See Bus. INs., Oct. 31, 1977, at 66. See also Schwartz, supra note 10, at 576.
280. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
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psychological effects of uncertainty and misinformation are, of
course, reflected in business decisions, these effects carry their
own inherent costs and burdens that should not be overlooked.
It is impossible to quantify the psychological costs of uncer-
tainty. The qualitative effects of the psychological burden, how-
ever, include frustration, anxiety, and lack of respect for the legal
system. Such psychological burdens have been noted in related
instances. Writing on the costs of "red tape," duplicative, confus-
ing, and frequently unnecessary government paperwork, a federal
commission concluded:
Psychological burdens may be more important than dollar costs to individ-
uals who experience:
-Frustration when completing complex forms;
-Anger when faced with multiple requests for similar data;
-Confusion in reading unclear instructions;
-Anxiety that errors may result in denial of benefits or legal conse-
quences; and
-Fear that confidential information may be abused.
281
Similar costs are incurred by those who must deal with the tort
litigation system on a day-by-day basis. Instead of complex forms,
manufacturers must deal with complex and increasingly confusing
standards of responsibility in designing and marketing their prod-
ucts. Instead of multiple requests for similar information, the
manufacturer is exposed to multiple causes of action in single ju-
risdictions and a multiplicity of theories across the fifty states. In
place of unclear instructions, a manufacturer is (at least in design
cases) often held to vague "reasonableness" standards with differ-
ent courts assigning different weights to different factors. There is
also the fear that a plaintiff, through discovery, can obtain, misin-
terpret, and misuse company documents. The analogy between
uncertainty in the tort litigation system and the confusion of dupli-
cative red tape is not an unduly strained one, and the psychologi-
cal costs are arguably similar.
The psychological costs of uncertainty also affect business deci-
sion-making. One specific consequence is that uncertainty tends
to produce overly cautious business decisions. Studies done on
choice-reaction time,2 82 that is, the time it takes to make a decision
or respond to a given amount of information, indicate that reaction
time gets longer linearly 283 as the amount of information in-
creases. 284 Applied to a manufacturer confronted with decisions to
281. COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, Final Summary Report, at 6.
282. See, e.g., R. LACHMAN, J. LACHMAN & E. BUTrERFIELD, COGNrrIVE PSYCHOLOGY
AND INFORMATION PROCESSING: AN INTRODUCTION 133 (1979).
283. If something functions linearly, the output is directly proportional to the
input.
284. See, e.g., Hick, On the Rate of Gain of Information, 4 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 11 (1952); Hyman, Stimulus Information as a Determinant of Reac-
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be made on product development, for example, such studies sug-
gest that a manufacturer may take more time to make those deci-
sions as the number of contradictory product liability laws
increase. This in turn increases the information that must be con-
sidered in making a decision. The perception of uncertainty about
the law may also result in overly cautious business decisions. In
another important study on choice-reaction time,285 it was deter-
mined that the time it takes to react to situations depends more on
how many possible stimuli people infer to be present than it does
on how many there actually are.286 The effects of uncertainty on
the manufacturer, therefore, depend not only upon how much in-
formation (how many laws or court decisions) there actually are to
be considered, but also upon how much information manufactur-
ers think there is to consider.2 87 Such a reaction would hardly
seem to promote risk-taking or innovative behavior. The truth of
this statement is best illustrated by looking at the actual impact of
uncertainty on business activities.
2. The Impact of Uncertainty on Doing Business: Limitations
on Product Development and Marketing and
Increased Transaction Costs.
The effects of product liability uncertainty are manifested
throughout the manufacturing process. From the initial decision
of whether or not to develop a product to the decision whether or
not to recall or remove a product from the market, uncertainty can
take its toll.288 At the same time, uncertainty is reflected in high
transaction costs. 289
tion Time, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 188 (1953). The experimental tax
reported by Hyman involved varying the amount of information in the dis-
play (of lights), and observing the corresponding changes in the subject's re-
action time to a stimulus presentation. Id. at 188.
285. See Fitts & Switzer, Cognitive Aspects ofInformation Processing, 63 J. EXPER-
IMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 321-29 (1962).
286. See J. LACHMAN, R. LACHMAN & E. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 282, at 144, for a
discussion of the results and implications of the experiment.
287. Id. This summary of the manufacturer's possible reaction is a paraphrase of
the description of the results of Fitts and Switzer's experiment. See supra
note 285.
288. These consequences are dictated by practical business considerations. The
costs associated with beginning a product line tend to be high, therefore pro-
viding a reason to put off development. Then too, once the start-up and ad-
vertising costs have been paid, they provide "positive incentives for a
manufacturer to continue production of a given line." McIntuff, Products Lia-
bility: The Impact on California Manufacturers, 19 AM. Bus. LJ., 343, 357
(1981). Therefore the impact of products liability law on manufacturers can
be gauged by examining whether product lines had to be dropped due to a
concern over the law. Id.
289. See generally PRODUCT IAaBILITY ALLIANCE, Economic Consequences of a
[Vol. 63:389
PRODUCT LIABILITY
In product development, the dampening effect of current prod-
uct liability laws has been noted. One study, for example, found
that eight percent of the firms surveyed delayed or cancelled the
introduction of new products over a two year period because of
product liability considerations. 290 Similarly, the National Federa-
tion of Independent Business reported that 12.8 percent of the al-
most 1,300 firms responding to its survey had stopped development
of a new product for similar reasons. 291 Decisions to curtail prod-
uct development are especially prevalent in small firms producing
high-risk products. 29 2 The importance of this is underscored by
the fact that small, high technology firms have traditionally been at
the forefront of product innovation. Abridged product develop-
ment has also been exhibited by companies producing
pharmaceuticals and medical devices. 2 93 As a result, "there may
be an adverse impact upon medical research and upon the devel-
opment and marketing of products which may be socially
beneficial."294
A specific example of a socially beneficial product development
that was adversely affected by uncertainty was the swine flu vac-
cine. Although Congress appropriated $135 million for the mass
immunization program, the pharmaceutical companies initially re-
fused to produce the vaccine due to an inability to obtain adequate
prpduct liability insurance. The companies and their insurers
were especially worried about potential defense costs and lengthy
litigation, although, under the laws of most states, they would
neither be subject to a duty to warn for unforeseeable risks, nor
subject to liability for unavoidable risks if a proper warning was
given.295 If Congress had not intervened and limited the liability of
the vaccine manufacturers by statute, the vaccine probably would
never have been produced.2 96 The swine flue epidemic never ma-
terialized and unfortunate side effects were experienced by some
of those who were administered the vaccine. Nevertheless, the ex-
ample is an important one: a future epidemic may indeed materi-
alize and pharmaceutical manufacturers may again refuse to
produce a necessary vaccine. The important point is that medical
authorities had determined that the product was both beneficial
Federal Product Liability Act 10-12 (July 2, 1982) (unpublished report) [here-
inafter cited as Report, Economic Consequences].
290. 1 INDusTRY STuDY, supra note 14, at IV-B; FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-
29.
291. See FmnAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-29 (quoting NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP.
BusnEss, SURvEY 11 (Jan., 1977)).
292. See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-29.
293. Id. at VI-31.
294. Id.
295. Id. at VI-30.
296. Cf. id. at VI-31.
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and necessary to protect public health. In spite of this, because
the vaccine was potentially risky in a minute number of cases, it
was almost kept off the market because of the existing rules of
product liability.
With continuously changing case law creating constantly new
or expanded liability rules, the curtailment of product develop-
ment is likely to continue. The Beshada2 97 decision was a prime
example. If other jurisdictions follow New Jersey and impose lia-
bility for the failure to warn of dangers that were undiscoverable at
the time of manufacture,29 8 companies might be justifiably wary of
producing any product that could in future years subject them to
liability if their safety research efforts at the time of manufacture
were later proven to be inadequate.299 However, even if other ju-
risdictions fail to follow New Jersey's lead, the law of that state will
be significant since national product development decisions are
often made on a "worst case" basis.300
It is, admittedly, difficult to ascertain with precision the net ef-
fect upon society of inhibited product development arising from
uncertainty in product liability law. Current law may deprive soci-
ety of some useful products; it may also keep other dangerous
products off the market or delay their introduction until safety im-
provements can be made. 301 There are undoubtedly benefits as
well as costs to the present product liability system. At the same
time, however, a uniform federal law would reduce the costs ex-
acted by uncertainty, while continuing to keep unduly dangerous
products out of the marketplace.
The related problem of product marketing is just as serious as
that of product development. The Task Force Industy Study dis-
covered that seven percent of the firms in its survey discontinued
products during 1975 and 1976,302 and that four percent reported
that they were considering discontinuing products.303 Similar re-
sults were noted by other surveys. A study conducted by the Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business found that 4.6 percent
of the same survey groups noted earlier had discontinued or
297. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 91 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). See
supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
298. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 91 N.J. 191, 209, 447 A.2d 539, 549
(1982).
299. Beshada represents at present a minority view. Nevertheless if manufactur-
ers do respond to the "worst case" idea, this case could have significant
impact.
300. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
301. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-30.
302. 1 INDusTRY STuDY, supra note 14, at IV-12, IV-13. See also FiNAL REPORT,
supra note 14, at VI-29.
303. 1 INDusTRY STUDy, supra note 14, at IV-63, Table IV-33. See also FiNAL RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at VI-29.
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planned to discontinue certain products due to product liability
considerations. 304 Seventeen percent of the businesses that re-
sponded to a survey conducted by five members of the House of
Representatives reported that they had abandoned at least one
product because of product liability considerations. 305 Finally, a
survey of California manufacturers on the impact of product liabil-
ity law noted that twenty-three percent of the small manufacturers
reported that they had dropped certain product lines due to prod-
uct liability law, while twenty-two percent of the large manufactur-
ers stated the same.3 06
Specific examples of products whose marketing has been af-
fected by product liability law range from relatively insignificant
devices to products that concern the entire public. One company
took an instrument that was designed to warn crane operators that
their booms were approaching unsafe conditions off the market be-
cause of the company's concern over potential liability should the
device fail.307 Such a product may not be considered significant in
terms of the entire society, but it was, within one industry, a fairly
innovative product that enhanced workplace safety.
A more significant example of a product that had been devel-
oped, but which was withdrawn from the market largely because of
liability concerns, was the airbag-a product that has been pro-
moted as a solution to the problem of carnage on the highways.
Despite initial indications that airbags would be required on new
cars, the government mandate was never clearly stated. Ulti-
mately, the government required only the installation of passive
restraints, including passive seatbelts.3 08 Airbag manufacturers
thus feared that automakers would, given the choice, opt to install
the less expensive belt system.309
More importantly, however, even absent the regulatory confu-
sion, product liability concerns could not be eliminated. An inabil-
ity to pin down insurance costs made it impossible for companies
to estimate the cost of the airbag.310 Eventually, the two largest
airbag manufacturers, Eaton Corporation and Allied Chemical, got
out of the airbag business.311 Eaton had spent over thirteen years
304. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-29 (quoting NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. BUSI-
NESS, SURVEY 11 (Jan. 1977)).
305. See F NAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-30.
306. McIntuff, supra note 288, at 357.
307. Statement of Richard Harris before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor,
Committee on Human Resources, Sept. 22, 1978 (mimeo at 4).
308. See Holt, Why Eaton Got out of the Airbag Business, FORTUNE, March 12, 1979,
at 146.
309. Id. at 147.
310. Id. at 148.
311. Id. at 146.
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and twenty million dollars developing the device.312 Potential lia-
bility was at the core of their decision to leave the field:
The liability question was never solved, and the companies still in the
business do not yet know the extent of their exposure or how it will be
covered. Eaton's insurance carriers initially estimated liability insurance
at about $10 per unit, then upped the figure to as much as $50, and finally
declined to give any quotation.3 13
Product liability concerns regarding airbags were not unwar-
ranted. The devices rely on a very complex technology, and must
function properly in a collision occurring ten years after the vehi-
cle is manufactured. 314 Moreover, airbags work best in front-end
collisions, and when used in conjunction with a seatbelt.31 5 But
the consumer might expect the airbag to offer protection from
every accident. Since the bags are designed to deploy only in dan-
gerous accidents, the chances of some injuries to consumers
whose cars are equipped with airbags are great.31 6 Thus, despite
the fact that, on balance, airbags would significantly improve the
safety of automobiles, the products "could become an endless mat-
ter for lawsuits."317
Uncertainty about the law not only inhibits production and
marketing, but also generates high transaction costs. The manu-
facturer must know the state of the law in order to produce legally
"safe" products. 318 In addition, the manufacturer must also know
the law in order to defend against possible product liability suits.
Since the tort litigation system is an adversarial one, manufactur-
ers must make large expenditures for the legal expertise necessary
to defend lawsuits.319 A significant proportion of the costs arise
from the need to determine the current law of the jurisdiction in
which case is to be tried, resolve conflict of law problems, and as-
sess the possibility that new law will be created.320
Recent data indicate that 109,000 product liability suits were
312. Id.
313. Id. at 148.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. The Product Liability Alliance has noted that:
The variations in product liability rules greatly increase the cost of
designing, manufacturing, packaging, labeling, shipping and selling
products in interstate commerce. Confronted with a crazy quilt of
product liability losses ... manufacturers must devote substantial
resources to making sure that their products satisfy the require-
ments of as many States as possible.
Report, Economic Consequences, supra note 289, at 19.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 11-12 & nn. 20-21.
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filed in federal and state courts in 1981.321 A uniform product liabil-
ity law could conceivably result in annual reductions of 218 to 436
million dollars in legal research costs generated by out-of-state
claims. 322 Those figures are based upon an estimate that, without
the need to engage local counsel and research the complex product
liability standards of the state in question, a business could save,
on the average, two to four thousand dollars on each case.323 Obvi-
ously, a uniform law could reduce the high transaction costs asso-
ciated with current product liability suits, and the savings to
manufacturers could result ultimately in savings to consumers.
3. The Effect of Uncertainty on Business Failures
Business failure represents perhaps the ultimate blow to firms
facing an uncertain tort litigation system. At the time of the Task
Force Report there were no verifiable product liability related
business failures 3 24 The Task Force did, however, predict that
business failures could be caused by product liability problems.3 25
It concluded, admittedly on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
that product liability concerns regarding adequate and affordable
product liability insurance could be a factor in the failure of small
manufacturers of high risk products 326. The Task Force also noted
that manufacturers, particularly small firms, might not have the
ability to respond to judgments rendered against them. An exces-
sive judgment or series of judgments handed down against a com-
pany with inadequate resources might drive it into bankruptcy.32 7
Subsequent developments in the area of asbestos litigation
have met, and exceeded, Task Force expectations. Asbestos litiga-
tion is unusual, since the first signs of cancer may not appear until
twenty to forty years after exposure.32 8 However, as new scientific
321. U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., June 14, 1982, at 62.
322. Report, Economic Consequences, supra note 287, at 11-12. The estimation of
the average savings on an out-of-state claim was made in a letter from Frank
Orban, senior attorney, Armstrong World Indus., to Sherman Unger, Dept. of
Commerce (May 19, 1982), quoted in id. Mr. Orban was the director of the
LEGAL STUy for the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability.
323. Report, Economic Consequences, supra note 289, at 11-12.
324. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-32.
325. Id. at VI-34, VI-54.
326. Id. at VI-54.
327. The FINAL REPORT noted that 29 percent of the small firms surveyed in the
INDusTRY STuDY did not carry product liability insurance. Although this does
not indicate that there is a massive availability problem-many of these firms
do not carry insurance because they feel they do not need it-it does indicate
that many firms have no resources to fall back on should a large judgment be
rendered against them. FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-34, VI-35.
328. Joseph, Firms That Didn't Mine or Sell Asbestos Are Also Caught in the Tide
of Litigation, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1982, at 56, cols. 1-2.
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techniques are developed that correlate chemical exposure to dis-
eases that develop years later, this type of suit could grow. In the
meantime, the Manville Corporation has had to seek Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection against the thousands of lawsuits that
threatened to absorb all of its assets. 329 Other companies, al-
though none as large as Manville, have also filed for Chapter 11
protection.330 Companies that have been sued, some three hun-
dred in all, 331 also face the prospect of having their financial state-
ments qualified because they are involved in asbestos litigation,
thus making it difficult for them to obtain needed financing. Fi-
nally, companies on the stock market must mention the possible
impact of asbestos litigation to those purchasing stock, regardless
of whether they have qualified financial statements. 332
The possibility that burgeoning latent disease litigation, such as
the asbestos crisis, 333 could precipitate the bankruptcy of a com-
pany as large as Manville was completely unforeseen by the Task
Force Report. The fact that it did occur serves as yet another illus-
tration of growing uncertainty in the tort litigation system.
4. The Effect of Uncertainty on Loss Prevention Programs
Although this Article has focused on the negative implications
of uncertainty in the tort litigation system, it would be inaccurate
to suggest that the present system has no positive features. One
logical response to a system imposing heavy liability on companies
for product-related injuries is the introduction of product liability
loss control programs. Insurers have a similar motivation for de-
veloping loss prevention programs to assist their clients. Many
businesses have responded to these incentives by implementing
such programs. 334
The significance of the increase in loss control programs is as
difficult to measure, however, as the impact of these programs in
reducing accidents. 335 Manufacturers have implemented various
329. Id. at 56, col. 1.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 56, col. 3.
333. Id. One study estimated that employers and insurers will pay from $38.2 bil-
lion to $90 billion in asbestos claims over the next 35 years. Id. at 56, cols. 2-3.
334. See FNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-47.
335. For instance, companies may differ in their perception of what constitutes a
product liability "loss control program," as opposed to what others would
consider ordinary manufacturing practices. Id. at VI-49. Moreover, manufac-
turers may have made less actual commitment to loss prevention programs,
when evaluated objectively, as compared to their own perceived commit-
ment. Id. at VI-50. Also, qualitative differences in the programs, such as the
impact such a program has on management decisions, are difficult to meas-
ure. Id. Thus, while the tort litigation system and higher premiums have had
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programs that emphasize better quality control, improved labeling,
and product redesign.336 One difficulty with these programs, how-
ever, is that they are apparently being implemented to a greater
degree in large and medium-sized firms, rather than smaller
firms. 337 This is important because product liability problems al-
most invariably impact smaller firms more severely than larger
ones, and may indicate that loss prevention programs are not be-
ing developed where they are most needed. There are, of course,
many reasons why most small firms have not developed loss pre-
vention programs. Small companies may lack the financial re-
sources to implement such programs. Then, too, individual small
firms may never have faced a product liability claim, and may feel
unconcerned about potential exposure to liability.338
Manufacturers are not alone in developing loss prevention pro-
grams. Insurers have implemented loss control programs to aid
their insureds as part of their underwriting services.3 39 The extent
and effectiveness of these services is uncertain. For example,
sixty-eight percent of the respondents to a telephone survey who
carried insurance had been inspected by loss prevention engi-
neers.340 Of the fims inspected, however, only forty-two percent
reported that their insurers made specific recommendations to re-
duce claims. Therefore, only twenty-nine percent of the firms who
carried insurance received specific advice about how to reduce
their product liability claims.341 Of the smaller firms carrying in-
surance, only fifty-four percent were inspected by their insurer
(compared to sixty-eight percent on the average).342 Thus smaller
firms, in addition to being less likely to implement loss prevention
programs on their own, are less likely to have received loss preven-
tion control services from their insurer.
One final reason why such programs may not have beneficial
effects is that manufacturers often perceive no relationship be-
tween their expenditures for loss prevention programs and smaller
a positive effect on loss prevention, "it is not possible to quantify the amount
on an industry-wide basis." Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at VI-49.
338. For example, 39 percent of the small manufacturers in one industry survey
that did not carry product liability insurance-58 percent did carry some form
of products insurance--did so because they "don't need any." Id. at VI-5. An-
other 27 percent "never considered it." Id.
339. Id. at VI-51.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. The INSURANCE STmUy's review of underwriting rules confirmed the im-
balance, but concluded that the problem was being corrected. INSURANCE
STUDY, supra note 14, at 1-43. See absoFINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-51.
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insurance premiums. 3 43 Although this conclusion is based on lim-
ited data, to the extent it is true, firms will have less incentive to
develop loss prevention programs or to participate in those of their
insurer. Thus, while it is true that under the present system prod-
uct liability litigation and its consequences have led to greater de-
velopment of loss control programs, both by companies and their
insurers, the extent and impact of those programs is difficult to
measure. The programs are less frequently utilized in smaller
firms, where the negative consequences of the product liability
problem tend to be concentrated. The insurance industry also pro-
vides little incentive to develop such programs, because product
liability insurance premiums are unrelated, or are at least per-
ceived to be unrelated, to the development or use of prevention
programs.
C. Uncertainty in the Tort Litigation System and Its Effect on
Consumers
As difficult as all of the effects of the product liability problem
are to measure, assessing its impact on consumers remains the
most elusive. This is probably because most effects on the con-
sumer are essentially derivative. Increased insurance costs may
ultimately affect the price the consumer pays for a product. A de-
cision not to develop or to stop marketing a product ultimately re-
stricts the consumer's choice in the marketplace. A decision to "go
bare," because insurance is too costly or truly unavailable, ulti-
mately determines whom in the distribution chain an injured con-
sumer can sue, whether the consumer can collect a judgment
rendered, and perhaps even the threshold question of whether the
consumer should sue at all. Because these effects flow only indi-
rectly from the uncertaiity in the tort litigation system, it is of
course more difficult to measure their impact. It is, however, im-
portant to discuss potential effects on the buying public because
opponents of tort reform often charge that such legislation is anti-
consumer. Whether this criticism is accurate depends on the sub-
stantive content of the final legislative product. But it is also incor-
rect and misleading to assume that the present system only
benefits consumers. Consumers also pay the price of uncertainty.
1. The Effect of Uncertainty on the Price of Products
One of the underlying concepts of product liability is loss
spreading. That is, it is more equitable for a loss to be spread
evenly among all purchasers of the product, than for each injured
plaintiff to have to bear the burden of a single accident. This con-
343. See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-52.
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cept necessarily implies that, as greater liability is imposed, the
price of products will increase. Similarly, one would expect that as
uncertainty in the tort system imposes its cost-most directly ex-
pressed through higher insurance premiums-the price of prod-
ucts would rise.
It is difficult to measure precisely how much the costs associ-
ated with product liability add to the price of products. Opponents
of tort reform often point to the fact that product liability insur-
ance usually costs less than one percent of a firm's sales.344 They
seem to assume that this figure also represents the percentage of a
product's cost attributable to product liability. Such a conclusion
represents, at best, a serious oversimplification. Insurance premi-
ums constitute only a small part of the total cost of product liabil-
ity for manufacturers. Other costs include the administrative
expenses, the cost of loss prevention programs, the cost of develop-
ing products that are held off the market, and legal expenses. In
addition, others in the distributive chain from manufacturer to
consumer pass along their product liability costs. The wholesaler
and retailer also might face exposure to products claims.3 45 Thus,
the ratio of the manufacturer's insurance costs to sales cannot be
assumed to equal the percentage of a product's price that is related
to product liability costs.
Although estimating the percentage of a product's cost attribu-
table to product liability concerns is a complicated proposition, es-
timates have been made. Sporting goods manufacturers have
alleged that fifteen percent of the price of their-product is attribu-
table to product liability concerns.34 6 Some machine tool manufac-
turers estimate that ten percent of their product's price reflects
product liability costs,34 7 a figure that is probably a "high water
mark" among larger industries.m These figures seem to indicate
that in certain high-risk industries, a large portion of the product
price can be attributed to product liability costs. Another example
is the airbag industry, were one manufacturer found its insurance
costs jumping from ten dollars a unit to fifty dollars a unit, and
finally was unable to obtain insurance at any cost.3 49
There are other companies that find themselves in the opposite
situation, wanting to pass along product liability costs, but unable
to do so. Tort theorists often assume that any cost that is incurred
can be automatically passed to consumers. This is not necessarily
344. See, e.g., id. at VI-15.
345. See id. at VI-28.
346. Id. at VI-27, VI-28.
347. Id.
348. Id. at VI-28.
349. See supra notes 308-17 and accompanying text.
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true; competition forces manufacturers to keep their prices fairly
close to those of their competitors in order to remain economically
viable. If a firm has to spend much more than its competitors be-
cause of product liability costs, it will be impossible for that firm to
pass along the entire cost and still remain competitive. This un-
tenable situation can arise where a firm has been in business for
many years, and its competitors have been in business for a short
time.350 The older firm's insurance premium can reflect potential
liability for products manufactured years ago but still in use. The
older firm will be unable to pass along a portion of its product lia-
bility costs in order to compete with the new firms. 35 1 This under-
mines the concept of product liability as a vehicle for spreading
loss.
2. Uncertainty in the Tort Litigation System and Inequities
in Loss Risk Distribution
Inequity in cost spreading is a key point in this Article's criti-
cism of the uncertainties fostered by the present multiple jurisdic-
tion system of product liability. While a California plaintiff can
prevail on a "market share" theory, this approach is unavailable to
plaintiffs who sue in many other states. 352 Insurance companies,
however, respond to developments in California and other leading
jurisdictions in product liability law in assessing nationwide pre-
mium rates. 3 53 These rates, which tend to be based on a "worst
case" basis, are fixed according to the maximum exposure to liabil-
ity in any jurisdiction.354 Thus, although consumers in a "con-
servative" jius &.&ion will contribute to the financing of recoveries
in "liberal" jurisdictions, they will at the same time lack the legal
advantages offered injured plaintiffs in the "worst case" state. The
inequity of this situation should be apparent. Why should con-
sumers be forced to finance a remedy that is available only to
plaintiffs in another state? This result also undermines any true
notion of loss spreading. The loss cannot be spread fairly among
those who use and benefit from a product if the remedy is not
available to all.
3. Other Costs of Uncertainty to Consumers
While other costs of uncertainty to consumers have already
been alluded to in other contexts, a brief summary is appropriate.
As uncertainty restricts product development, consumers are de-
350. See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 328, at 56, col. 1.
351. See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at VI-27.
352. See supra notes 56-104 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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prived of product choices that would otherwise be available to
them. For certain product-related situations, for example, those
involving vaccines, 355 the overall level of consumer safety may ac-
tually be decreased. A vaccine may not be marketed because its
makers fear million dollar claims for side effects in a small number
of cases per millions of doses, even though the vaccine could save
thousands of lives. If this happens, the overall negative effect on
the consuming public is substantial. This is an ironic result in a
system that claims to increase incentives to make products safe by
holding manufacturers strictly liable.
Lack of affordable insurance for manufacturers of certain prod-
ucts can also impose costs on consumers. For example, if a manu-
facturer has decided to "go bare" because of soaring insurance
costs, an injured consumer may try to sue the retailer, or someone
else in the product's distribution chain. The manufacturer's lack of
insurance will also impair the retailer's right to indemnification
should the latter be required to pay the judgment. In some cases,
insurance availability may make it impractical for the claimant to
sue at all, or impossible for him to collect a judgment.356
IV. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL REFORM
The previous sections of this Article have catalogued the diver-
sity of existing product liability laws and have demonstrated some
of the qualitative and quantitative costs of this lack of uniformity.
Assuming that uniformity has been proven to be a desirable goal,
the only remaining question is how best to achieve that result.
This section argues that federal legislation is the most effective
mechanism through which to establish a uniform law of product
liability.
A. The Inherent Inability of State Law to Achieve Uniformity
This Article has previously argued that present product liability
reforms at the state level have done nothing to alleviate uncer-
tainty.357 The following discussion goes beyond the diversity of
current reform efforts to explain why state reform cannot achieve
a desireable uniformity. The federal government has thus far
opted for a model uniform law approach 358 which does not directly
interfere with the present substantive state law. This approach,
however, is unlikely to achieve uniformity.
355. See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
356. It might also make it difficult for injured parties to obtain legal counsel on a
contingent fee basis.
357. See generally supra notes 173-95 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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1. Why a Model Uniform Law Cannot Achieve Uniformity in
the Tort System
a. Unifom Laws Are Not Uniformly Adopted
One significant barrier to any uniform approach to product lia-
bility law is that the statute cannot foster uniformity unless it is
adopted by a large number of the states. The history of the uni-
form law movement indicates, however, that widespread adoption
is often the exception rather than the rule. For example, of the
seven uniform acts that were predecessors to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC), only three-the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act-were adopted in every state.359 The Uniform
Sales Act, the predecessor of Article 2 of the UCC, was adopted in
only two-thirds of the states, as was the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act. The remaining two acts were even less well-received than the
Sales Act or the Trust Receipts Act.360
Lack of uniform adoption continues to plague the uniform law
movement today. While some uniform acts are adopted in all, or
nearly all, jurisdictions, 3 61 others have not been adopted in any ju-
risdiction,362 or by only a handful of jurisdictions.3 63 Some have
359. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 352 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK, UNIFORM STATE
LAWS]; Taylor, Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment
A Confluence of Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 339 (1978).
360. Professors White and Summers report that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
was adopted by less than two-thirds of the states. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-3 (1980). How-
ever, both the HANDBOOK, UNIFORM STATE LAWS, supra note 359, and Taylor,
supra note 359, show that it was adopted in every state.
361. E.g., UNtF. ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT A
STATE IN CRIM. PROC., 11 U.L.A. 5 (1936); UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT,
9 U.LA. 195 (1970); UNIF. CRIMINAL EXTRADrION ACT, 11 U.LA. 59 (1936);
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT 6 U.L.A. (1914); UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF
SUPPORT ACT, 9A U.L.A 643 (1968); UNF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT, 8 U.L.A.
605 (1953); UNF. TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT, 8 U.L.A. 629 (1942);
UNIF. VETERANS GUARDIANSHIP ACT, 8 U.L.A. 641 (1942). The status of the re-
spective acts is detailed in HANDBOOK, UNIFORM STATE LAws, which contains
a convenient table showing the adoption of uniform acts on a state-by-state
basis. See HANDBOOK, UNIFORM STATE LAws, supra note 359, at 367-70.
362. E.g., UNiT. AuDIo-VISUAL DEPOSITION ACT, 12 U.LA. 8 (1978 & Supp. 1983);
UNIF. COMPARA=Trv FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 35 (1977 & Supp. 1983); UNIF. CONDO-
MInuiu ACT, 7 U.L.A. 124 (1980 & Supp. 1983); UNiF. DRUG DEPENDENCE TREAT-
MENT AND REHABILITATION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 667 (1973); UNIF. EMINENT DOMAIN
CODE, 13 U.L.A. 1 (1974); UNiF. EXEMPTIONS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 365 (1976); UNIF.
LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 539 (1977); UNIF. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCi-
DENT PREPARATIONS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 41 (1972); UNF. SIMPLIFICATIONS OF LAND
TRANSFER ACT, 14 U.L.A. 209 (1977); UHF. SURVIVAL AND DEATH ACT, 8 U.L.A.
324 (1979 & Supp. 1983). See HANDBOOK, UNIFORM STATE LAws, supra note
359, at 367-70.
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been adopted in a substantial number of jurisdictions.364 Accord-
ingly, although some uniform acts can be characterized as success-
ful, if the level of adoption is accepted as one measure of success,
other uniform acts are dismal failures. 365
If the level of adoption is the measure of success, then the
Model Uniform Products Liability Act366 must presently be charac-
terized as a failure. While there has been a flurry of product liabil-
ity reform legislation at the state level in the last few years,3 67 the
Model Uniform Act has yet to be adopted by any state.36 8 Al-
though a few commentators have suggested adopting a wait-and-
see attitude about the Model Act,369 a more realistic assessment is
that it will never be widely adopted at the state level.37 0
363. E.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (6); UNIF. BRAIN DEATH ACT (1); UNIF. CLASS Ac-
TIONS ACT (1); UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT (3); UNIF. DISCLAIMER
OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT (2); UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL,
INTESTACY, OR APPOINTMENT ACT (4); UNiV. DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS UNDER
NONTESTAmENTARY INSTRUMENTS ACT (3); UNIF. FEDERAL LIEN REGISTRATION
ACT (5); UNIF. WILLS ACT (1); UNIF. JUVENILE COURTS ACT (2); UNIF. PUBLIC
ASSEMBLY ACT (2); UNIV. STATE ANTITRUST ACT (2); UNIF. STATUS OF CON-
VICTED PERSONS ACT (2); UNIF. SUPERVISION OF TRUSTEES FOR CHARITABLE
PURPOSES ACT (4). See HANDBOOK, UNIFORM STATE LAWS, supra note 359, at
367-70.
364. E.g., UNiF. ARBITRATION ACT (35); UNiF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
(39); UNIF. COMMON TRUST FUND ACT (35); UNiF. DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED
PROPERTY ACT (31); UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT (36);
UNiF. FEDERAL TAX LIEN REGISTRATION ACT (40); UNIF. PHOTOGRAPHIC COPIES
AS EVIDENCE ACT (39); UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT (37); UNIF. SECURI-
TIES ACT (34); UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS ACT
(39). See HANDBOOK, UNIFORM STATE LAws, supra note 359, at 367-70.
365. It is not the intention of this Article to imply that the level of adoption is the
only measure of success. Indeed, many finely drafted uniform acts might not
be adopted because they are politically infeasible. Such might be the case
with the model Uniform Product Liability Act itself. Other acts might not be
adopted because they are not perceived to be important enough to warrant
initial legislative action, or changing existing state law. In the final analysis,
however, a uniform law obviously must be widely adopted if it is to have a
significant impact, and if it is to achieve uniformity.
366. See supra note 15.
367. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
368. One commentator has characterized the Model Act's effectiveness as follows:
"The smoke of discussion has thus far exceeded the fire of enactment. Even
where the UPLA has inspired state legislation, the resulting legislation is
quite different from the UPLA in its present form." Ribstein, The Model Uni-
form Product Liability Act- Pinning Down Products Law, 46 J. Am L. & Com.
349, 355 (1981) (footnote omitted).
369. See, e.g., remarks of Homer E. Mayer (Carter Administration's Commerce
Dept. General Counsel) ("It is premature to guage the state reaction to the
Uniform Product Liability Act.... [T] he state legislatures have had only a
few months to review it in its final form."), quoted in, Fisher, Carter Backs
State Level Tort Reform, Nat'l Underwriter, May 2, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
370. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 368, at 355-56: "If the future of the UPLA is in
the states, its history to date would suggest that it is highly unlikely that it
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Even if the model uniform law approach were ultimately suc-
cessful, in the sense that a majority of the states adopt the Act, the
approach would still be unwieldly and would yield few benefits be-
cause of the time lag inherent in state-by-state adoption.371 Even
the most successful state-adopted uniform laws have experienced
this difficulty, with the Uniform Commercial Code providing a
prominent example. The idea of a comprehensive commercial
code was conceived in 1940, when the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws decided to draft a revised Sales Act as the basis for a
comprehensive code.372 After the American Law Institute joined
the project in the mid-1940s, a final official draft was issued in 1952.
This version was adopted by only one state, Pennsylvania. 373 After
criticism of the initial effort by the New York Law Revision Com-
mission, a revised version of the Code was published in 1958. By
1961, thirteen states had enacted the UCC.374 By 1967, forty-nine
states had adopted the 1962 version.375 In 1972, further revisions
were made, primarily to Article 9.376 Thus far, thirty-nine jurisdic-
tions have adopted the 1972 version of the Article.3 77 In 1977, the
Permanent Editorial Board promulgated a new Official Text mak-
ing revisions in Article 8 on Investment Securities.378 Five states
have adopted the 1977 version of Article 8.379
The experience with the UCC demonstrates two inherent diffi-
culties with state-by-state enactment of uniform laws. The first is
a time lag in initial adoption. It took twenty-seven years from the
time the UCC was conceived in 1940 until it was finally adopted by
forty-seven states in 1967.380 The second difficulty is the time lag in
will achieve anything like the uniformity which has been brought to commer-
cial law by the Uniform Commercial Code."
371. See LEGAL STUDY, supra note 14, at 71-72.
372. Interestingly, the idea appears to have originated in response to an effort to
enact a Federal Sales Act. See Taylor, supra note 359, at 340-41.
373. Id. at 341. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 360, at 3-6.
374. Taylor, supra note 359, at 341. These states enacted the 1958 version.
375. Id. The lone dissenter was the "lost tribe" of Louisiana. Although that state
has adopted articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the U.C.C., Louisiana has not adopted
the two most prominent articles of the Code Article 2 on Sales and Article 9
on Secured Transactions. Nor has it adopted Article 6 on Bulk Transfers. 1
U.L.A. 1 & n.3 (Supp. 1983).
376. Taylor, supra note 359, at 341.
377. See 1 U.L.A. 1-2 & nn.1-2 (Supp. 1983).
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Even if one does not count the 12 years of development prior to the promulga-
tion of the first official text in 1952, the time lag is the rule rather than the
exception: "[Ilt required twenty-eight years to have the N.I.L. enacted by all
the states, fifteen years to accomplish the same result with the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act and forty-seven years to have the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act adopted in every jurisdiction." Schnader, Why the Uniform
Commercial Code Should Be "Uniform", 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237, 239
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the adoption of revisions to the law. Article 9 is the prime example
here. Although the 1972 revision of Article 9 has been in existence
for eleven years, fourteen states have yet to adopt it. Thus, there
are two Article 9's: two versions for lawyers to master, for students
to learn, for teachers to teach, and for writers to write about-two
versions of one of the most important articles of what is supposed
to be a Uniform Commercial Code.381 Thus, when revisions in uni-
form laws are adopted on a state-by-state basis, the same confu-
sion and lack of uniformity that permeated the law prior to
widespread adoption of the Code will appear again as revisions are
adopted on piecemeal basis, a cycle that will repeat itself as more
revisions are made.
b. The Best Uniform Laws Cannot Achieve Uniformity
Even if one assumes that a uniform product liability law will be
adopted by nearly all of the states, state-by-state enactment will
not achieve a truly uniform statutory scheme. The UCC demon-
strates that even the most successful uniform law cannot achieve
true uniformity.3 82 The truth of this observation is evidenced by
open-ended and optional drafting, non-uniform amendments, and
interpretational differences.
Open-ended and optional drafting are two related, but slightly
different, methods of drafting that inject a facial uncertainty into
the statutory scheme. "Open-ended" drafting occurs when the
statute itself uses vague and general language. Examples of open-
ended drafting in the UCC include the use of terms such as "rea-
sonable," and "good faith."383 Optional drafting, on the other hand,
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Schnader, Why the Code Should Be Uniform ].
Schnader lists different figures at a later date. Schnader, The Uniform Com-
mercial Code-Today and Tomorrow, 22 Bus. LAw. 229 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Schnader, The Code Today & Tomorrow] (28 years for the N.LL., but
49 years for the U.W.R.A., and 30 years for the U.S.T.A.). The point is that it
takes a long time to get a uniform law adopted in all jurisdictions.
381. White and Summers refer to the failure of the states to enact uniformly the
1972 version of the UCC as "a major source of non-uniformity among the vari-
ous states." J. WrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 360, at 5.
382. White and Summers have stated that: "Judged by its reception in the enact-
ing jurisdictions, the Code is the most spectacular succcess story in the his-
tory of American law." Id. If this is the case, given the prolonged period of
time required and the persisting failure to achieve true uniformity, see supra
notes 372-81 and accompanying text & infra notes 383-407 and accompanying
text, then the viability of uniform laws as a solution to the product liability
problem is doubtful.
383. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 360, at 8. A few examples of the use of
such terms in U.C.C. include: § 2-204(3) (contract does not fail for indefinite-
ness if terms are left open, and there is a reasonably certain basis for an
appropriate remedy); § 2-306(1) (quantity term expressed as output of the
seller or requirements of the buyer means actual output or requirements as
19841
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is exemplified by sections that allow the states to adopt one of two
or more statutory alternatives designed to cover a particular type
of transaction.384 While open-ended and optional drafting un-
doubtedly contribute to the diversity between differing states' ver-
sions of the UCC, these techniques may not represent a serious
deficiency in the state-by-state approach, since the difficulties
presented by optional provisions can be remedied by different
drafting techniques.385 The confusion caused by open-ended pro-
visions, however, may be unavoidable. 386 Problems created by the
open-ended technique, therefore, might be present to some degree
even in a statute adopted at the federal level.
The second major reason that even a widely-adopted uniform
law will never be truly uniform is the ubiquitous existence of non-
may occur in good faith, except a party may not tender a quantity unreasona-
bly disproportionate to any stated estimate); § 2-504(a) (if seller is required
or authorized to send the goods to a buyer and is not contractually required
to deliver them to a particular destination, seller must make a reasonable
contract of carriage for their transportation; § 2-603(3) (in complying with du-
ties regarding rightfully rejected goods, buyer is held only to good faith stan-
dard).
The concept of good faith under the Code is made even more uncertain by
two definitions of good faith. Section 1-201(19) gives the general definition of
good faith: "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Sec-
tion 2-103(1) (b), however, applies a stricter standard to a merchant with re-
gard to the sale of goods. Good faith in the latter context means: "honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards offair dealing in
the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (b) (emphasis added). Of course, the italicized
part of the latter definition is itself a prime example of open-ended drafting.
384. J. WHTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 360, at 8. Examples of this type of drafting
include: § 9-401 (three alternatives for the place of filing Article 9 financing
statements); and § 2-318 (three alternatives as to third party beneficiaries of
warranties, i.e., priority requirements in warranty actions). Similarly, § 6-106
imposes a duty on a bulk transferee to pay the creditors of the transferors;
however, the section is optional at the discretion of the individual state.
Of course, the three alternatives under § 2-318 prevent the UCC from ad-
ding any degree of certainty to the warranty branch of product liability law.
See Taylor, supra note 359, at 345-46.
385. This position is may not necessarily prove true. For example, if three ver-
sions of a controversial section are necessary to assure that a uniform law is
well received (so that each state can adopt a version that suits it), then op-
tional drafting represents an inherent deficiency in state-by-state adoption.
On the other hand, if the alternatives merely reflect confusion in the previ-
ous state of the law, or disagreement among the statute's draftsmen, then
optional drafting does not inherently discredit state-by-state adoption, but
does discredit the draftsmen who were supposed to produce a "uniform" law.
386. Unavoidable ambiguity reflects the truism that a comprehensive statute can-
not provide for all contingencies. Thus, a certain looseness in the statute, and
the use of vague terms such as "good faith" and "reasonableness" may be
necessary because some legal principles cannot be precisely defined. See
Taylor, supra note 359, at 349-52.
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uniform local amendments.38 7 One of the chief reasons for the pro-
mulgation of the UCC was that there were so many non-uniform
modifications of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. 38 8 The
drafters assumed that this problem would not plague the UCC.
They predicted that it would be adopted "without a single variation
from the text approved by the Code's Editorial Board."389 The po-
tentially destructive impact of non-uniform admendments, how-
ever, had become apparent by 1966:
Today, there are upwards of 750 non-uniform variations in the 49 Codes
which have been adopted by American jurisdictions. There is some conso-
lation in the fact that 195 of of the Code's 399 sections have not been
amended by any state, and that 76 additonal sections have each been
amended by only a single state. This all adds up to having something
more than 50% of the Code's section substantially uniform throughout 49
of our jurisdictions. But the clear fact is that the entire code as written on
our statute books, just isn't uniform.3 90
This lack of uniformity in the UCC has led commentators to sug-
gest its adoption at the federal level.391 But diversity in the statu-
tory language is not the only reason to advocate federal adoption.
c. Different Interpretations of Uniform Provisions
When a particular uniform law is adopted widely, and the spe-
cific provison is neither open-ended, optional, nor varied by local
amendment, a final barrier to uniformity still remains under the
state-by-state approach: disparate state court interpretations of
the law. Uniform acts prior to the UCC suffered due to multiple
interpretations of individual sections. For example, seventy-six of
the 198 sections of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law had
been subjected to multiple interpretations by 1958.392 These vary-
ing interpretations destroyed the effect of uniformity that the acts
might have brought to commercial law, and provided a principal
impetus for drafting the UCC.393
Unfortunately, UCC sections have also fallen prey to multiple
interpretations from state courts. Many such interpretations have
been noted by the commentators, and a comprehensive listing of
387. "Local" is used here in the sense that the amendment is unique to the adopt-
ing state.
388. See Schnader, Why the Code Should Be Uniform, supra note 380, at 239.
389. Schnader, The Code Today & Tomorrow, supra note 380, at 230.
390. Id. at 230-31.
391. E.g., id. at 231-33. See also Henson, The Problem of Uniformity, 20 Bus. LAw.
689, 695 (1965).
392. See Taylor, supra note 359, at 339. By the time the UCC was prepared, more
than 80 sections of the N.LL. were subject to differing interpretations.
Minahan, The Eroding Uniformity of the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Ky.
LJ. 799, 801 (1977).
393. See Note, Disparate Judicial Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code
- The Need for Federal Legislation, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 722, 723-34.
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the variations is beyond the scope of this Article. One commenta-
tor, however, has summarized some of the interpretational ques-
tions on which different jurisdictions have reached different
answers:
Does the sale of a radio station constitute a "sale of goods" within the
scope of Article 2? Is an agreement to provide data processing services
within the scope of Article 2? Are farmers "merchants" within the mean-
ing of Section 2-201? Does the Code require an "as is" disclaimer to be
conspicious? Do implied warranties apply to injuries to animals? Does a
payee have any interest in a negotiable instrument prior to delivery?
Does the "any person" language in UCC Section 3-406 apply to a certifying
bank? Does the term "equipment" constitute a sufficient description of
collateral in a security agreement? May an auto dealer who purchases
cars from another auto dealer qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of
business? When does the 10-day grace period in UCC Section 9-312(4)
commence to run if the collateral was in the possession of the debtor
before the execution of a purchase money security agreement? 394
Another commentator has subdivided interpretational varia-
tions into two categories: interpretational mishaps, and legitimate
differences. 3 95 The former category involves inaccurate interpreta-
tions of the code section in question; in other words, mistakes. 396
The latter category simply recognizes that in close cases of statu-
tory interpretation, reasonable minds can reach different, but rea-
sonable, results. 3 97 Legitimate interpretational differences
represent an inherent defect in the ability of the state-by-state ap-
proach to achieve uniformity: "[L]egitimate interpretational dif-
ferences are inevitable if there is not one final arbiter of the
meaning of a statute."3 98 Because there is no single supreme court
to reconcile variations which arise under the UCC, interpretational
uniformity is a practical impossiblity, even if the courts use proper
methods of stautory interpretation.3 99
394. Minahan, supra note 392, at 802-03 (citations omitted). See also Note, supra
note 393, at 745-50.
395. Taylor, supra note 359, at 355-61.
396. An example of such an error is the frequently cited and much maligned case
of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding
that the common law "last shot" contract formation doctrine in "battle of the
forms" situations survived the clear language of UCC § 2-207). See Taylor,
supra note 359, at 357-58 (criticizing Roto-Lith for judicially rewriting U.C.C.
§ 2-207(1) and repealing U.C.C. § 2-207(3)).
397. Taylor lists the question of whether a buyer must prove reliance on an ex-
press warranty under UCC § 2-313 as an example of an issue upon which
courts could legitimately differ, and have differed. Taylor, supra note 359, at
359-61.
398. Id. at 358. See also Minahan, supra note 392, at 819-20.
399. The Supreme Court of the United States cannot presently fill this position of
"final arbiter" for a number of reasons. First, in a UCC case brought in fed-
eral court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982),
the federal court would be constrained under the Erie doctrine, see supra
note 170, to apply the law of the state in which the district court is sitting.
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State court provincialism also often fosters interpretational
mishaps. Such provincialism manifests itself in several ways. For
example, a jurisdiction may ignore the decisonal law of other
states that have adopted the uniform law. When uniform laws are
adopted on a state-by-state basis, uniformity of interpretation can
be achieved only if the decisional law of sister states is consid-
ered.400 Experience with the UCC demonstrates that state courts
will take widely divergent views as to the precedential value to be
given to sister state decisions interpreting identical code provi-
sions. While some courts follow, or at least consult, the decisions
of sister states as a matter of course, others completely ignore such
precedent. The vast majority of state courts express a viewpoint
somewhere between these two extremes.40 ' Even when a decison
appears consistent with sister state decisions, however, the simi-
larity may be merely accidental, in that it reflects a continuance of
that state's prior law "rather than a conscious promulgation of for-
eign code precedent."4 02
In a related vein, courts interpret uniform laws in accordance
with their own state's prior law.40 3 Many courts have taken this
approach in UCC cases.40 4 Although the use of earlier non-code
law is arguably acceptable as a gap-filling device and an aid to in-
terpretation and construction, some courts have viewed prior law
as viable unless clearly displaced by the UCC.405 This approach
endangers uniformity: it places a premium on non-uniform law
that existed prior to the uniform act.406 The third, and most egre-
gious, type of provincialism manifests iteself in decisions where
state courts rely on their previous law, even when it has been
Thus, in diversity cases, there can be no overriding federal law to provide
uniformity; the federal court must try to decide the case as the state court
would, and any judicial review is also predicated on state law.
Second, a state statute is unlikely to present a federal question arising
"under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982). Although there may be exceptional UCC cases that do raise
federal questions, or that find their way to the Supreme Court under other
jurisdictional statutes, such cases do little or nothing to provide uniformity of
interpretation, since they only resolve questions peripheral to the interpreta-
tion of the state law. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)
(holding there was no "state action" in a warehouseman's private sale of
goods entrusted to him as permitted by the self-help provision of U.C.C. § 7-
210).
400. See Minahan, supra note 392, at 819-21.
401. See id. at 820.
402. Note, supra note 393, at 729-30.
403. See Minahan, supra note 392, at 819-20.
404. Id. at 818-19 n.86.
405. Id. at 819.
406. Id.
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clearly displaced by the uniform law's provisions. 07 Obviously,
any prospects of uniform interpretation are eliminated when a
court chooses this approach to statutory interpretation.
2. Other Problems With State Adoption of Uniform Law
State courts interpreting newly adopted uniform law through
the filter of their previous idiosyncratic law erect substantial barri-
ers to uniformity.408 There is also the danger, however, that a court
may actually interpret a statute out of existence. 409 An example
from the analogous field of medical malpractice law is illustrative.
In Helling v. Carey,410 the Supreme Court of Washington held, as a
matter of law, that opthalmologists were required to administer
glaucoma tests to all patients, regardless of age. The custom of the
profession had been to check routinely for glaucoma only in pa-
tients older than age forty.411 Thus, Helling held opthalmologists
to a higher standard of care than was the custom of their
profession.412
The state legislature responded to Helling in 1975 with the fol-
lowing legislative mandate:
In any civil action for damages based on professional negligence against
,. .[any] member of the healing arts... the plaintiff in order to prevail
shall be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant or defendants failed to exercise that degree of skill, care and
learning possessed by other persons in the same profession .... 413
In spite of the seemingly clear language of the statute, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court held, in Gates v. Jensen,4 14 that the judi-
cially created Helling rule was not abrogated by the statute. The
407. Note, supra note 393, at 730. This is probably what happened in Roto-Lith,
Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). As one commentator
observed: "In places in the opinion, one gets the impression that the court
simply could not believe what it said when it adopted § 2-207." Taylor, supra
note 359, at 357 n.77.
408. See supra notes 394-407 and accompanying text.
409. This danger is quite similar to the most egregious form of provincialism, in
which a court applies prior law that has been clearly displaced by a uniform
law. See supra note 407 and accompanying text. This concern is broader, be-
cause it applies to all types of state laws, and not merely to uniform laws.
The problem is, however, closely related.
Of course, this is yet another way to characterize the infamous Roto-Lith
case. See supra notes 396 & 407.
410. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
411. Id. at 516, 519 P.2d at 982, 983.
412. Such a holding is based on the premise that sometimes an entire industry or
profession may adhere to a standard of care that is less than reasonable.
Such analysis is not new to the law. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d
Cir. 1932) (coastline carriers' general practice of using tugs that are not
equipped with radios was an unreasonable commercial standard).
413. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1982).
414. 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
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majority noted that the original bill introduced in the House would
have established the standard of care as "that skill and care prac-
ticed by others in the same profession and speciality,"4 15 while the
statute as enacted required physicians "to exercise the skill, care
and learning possessed by others in the same profession."416 The
majority summarily stated that the statute, as enacted, used
broader language, which allowed application of the Helling rule.41 7
In his strong dissent, Justice Dolliver noted that the legislative
history of the bill, as expressed in committee reports, clearly and
expressly sought to overrule Helling.4 18 The dissent concluded by
saying the plaintiff's proposed instruction, as adopted by the ma-
jority, was "absolutely contrary to the mandate of the legisla-
ture."4 19 Viewed in this light, it now appears that Judge Hand's
famous words concerning the common law standard of care, that
"[c] ourts must in the end say what is required, 42 0 now apply even
when the legislature acts to override a court's previous
pronouncements.
In a related vein, the fact that a reform would pass constitu-
tional muster, if enacted by Congress and upheld by the Supreme
Court, does not mean that similar state reform will be upheld by
state supreme courts under state constitutional provisions.4 21
"Technical" barriers are frequently found in state constitutions
that provide, for example, that a legislative bill may contain only
one subject, and that this subject must be reflected in the title of
the bill.422 While these provisions vary from state to state, they
can trap the unwary reformer, and may totally invalidate a statute.
Although such provisions constitute "mere technicalities," they
are constitutional guarantees. 423
More important, however, is the possible impact of substantive
state constitutional provisions, including state equal protection
415. Id. at 253, 595 P.2d at 924.
416. Id. at 253, 254, 595 P.2d at 925.
417. Id. One judge, however, noted the majority's lack of elaboration as to why
'possessed" was necessarily broader than "practiced." Id. at 256, 257, 595 P.2d
at 926 (Dolliver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
418. Id. at 256, 257, 595 P.2d at 925 (Dolliver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
419. Id. at 257, 595 P.2d at 926 (Dolliver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
420. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
421. Of course, a state supreme court is the ultimate arbiter of that state's consti-
tutional provisions. A state may grant greater protections under its constitu-
tion than granted by the U.S. Constitution. Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
422. See C. NurrmNG & R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 300-13
(1978).
423. See generally id at 278-79.
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and due process clauses, and provisions guaranteeing access to the
courts. Legislation in areas similar to product liability has been
invalidated under such provisions.424 State product liability re-
form legislation has also been challenged under these provisions
with, as might be expected, differing results. In Batilla v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. ,425 the Supreme Court of Florida struck down
Florida's twelve-year statute of repose for product liability actions
as violative of the state constitutional guarantee of access of the
courts. The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, rebuffed the con-
stitutional challenge to a repose statute under a similar state con-
stitutional provision.426
Many state reform statutes have yet to be challenged. But
these initial cases demonstrate that it is certainly possible that
many present statutes will be struck down. Then, too, if a uniform
statute were widely adopted (on a state-by-state basis), it would
be subject to constitutional challenge in every state, and under
widely varying constitutional provisions. Even when the constitu-
tional provisions are similar, state courts will often interpret them
424. The cases on medical malpractice reform are collected in Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d
583 (1977).
In the 1960's, approximately 30 jurisdictions passed date-of-sale provisions
limiting the liability of architects and builders for improving real property.
These statutes, with limitation periods ranging from three to 20 years, are
similar to product liability statutes of repose enacted in many jurisdictions.
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. In 11 jurisdictions the build-
ers' and architects' statutes were upheld, but in five states they were found to
violate state and federal equal protection guarantees. See Note, Date-of-Sale
Statutes of Limitation: An Effective Means of Implementing Change in Prod-
ucts Liability Law? 30 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 123, 146-47 (1979).
425. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980)..
426. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981). An intermediate
appellate court in Illinois has recently upheld that state's 10 year date-of-sale
statute of repose against a challenge under the state due process clause.
Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 725-27, 425 N.E.2d 522, 524-26 (111.
App. Ct. 1981). The court also rejected a challenge under the Illinois version
of the access to the courts provision, expressly repudiating Batilla. Id. at 728,
425 N.E.2d at 526. The court noted, however, that the Illinois provision had
not been so broadly construed as the Florida provision at issue in Batilla. Id.
at 728, 425 N.E.2d at 526. However, a North Carolina intermediate court de-
clared the North Carolina statute of repose invalid under that state's access
to the court's provision. Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589,
284 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme
Court did not reach the constitutional issue. Bolick v. American Barmag
Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 SE.2d 415 (1982).
Both Florida and Indiana have rebuffed challenges to their statutes of re-
pose under their state's constitutional title/subject matter provisions. Dague
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207, 213-15 (Ind. 1981) (the Indiana provi-
sion without a corresponding limitation on the title); Purk v. Federal Press
Co., 387 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1980) (title was sufficiently detailed to reasonably
serve notice to interested parties).
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differently. In addition, different parts of a state-adopted uniform
law or code would probably be struck down in different states, thus
making a shambles of any notion of uniformity.
B. Objections to Federal Products Liability Reform
Although a state-by-state approach will never achieve a mean-
ingful level of uniformity in product liability law, many argue that
federal legislation is not the answer. There are both theoretical
and practical objections to federal reform.
1. Theoretical Objections to Federal Reform
a. Interference with States' Rights and Preemption of the
"Laboratory of Ideas" Concept
The states' rights objection, and the laboratory of ideas argu-
ment, are closely related. The latter argues that state experimen-
tation with different approaches to a particular legal problem will
eventually reveal the most effective solution, and it is used as a
justification for the more general concept that tort doctrines
should remain the common law province of the states. Thus, these
objections will be treated together.
The federal government has generally refrained from entering
the field of state common law tort development. 42 7 Congress has,
however, used the established power of the commerce clause 428 to
preempt traditional state tort law in certain areas in order to es-
tablish uniformity. The most prominent example of its pursuit of
tort uniformity through federal reform is the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA).429 FELA prempts state law regarding inju-
ries to railroad workers. When Congress passed the statute in
1908, as a response to the industrial revolution and laissez faire
economics, 30 it acted in an era when railroad law was synonymous
427. 4 LEGAL STUDY, supra note 14, at 73-74; INSURANCE STUDY, upra note 14, at
ES 13-14.
428. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
429. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). The federal government also entered the product
liability field of warranties in 1975 with the enactment of the Magnusson-
Moss Warranty Act., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1982).
430. See Griffith, The Vindication of a National Public Policy Under the Federal
Employers'Liability Act; 18 LAw & CoNTrEMP. PROBS. 160 (1953):
The period intervening between the beginning in America of the rail-
way epoch and the final enactment of the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act in 1908, saw the rise and fall of laissezfaire-the doctrine of
non-interferences by government in matters concerning Labor. That
doctrine.., in which the laborer was regarded merely as a chattel in
the hands of capital, bore down with heavy tragedy upon the operat-
ing railroad man.
Id. at 163.
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with state tort law.431
Lack of uniformity in state regulation, as well as inherent job
danger, contributed to the short working life of railroad employ-
ees. 4 32 A brakeman's chances of dying a natural death in 1888, for
example, were 1 to 4.7,433 and the average life expectancy of a
switchman in 1893 was seven years.43 4 Casualties from working on
the railroad rivaled those sustained during numerous battles of the
Civil War.435 Courts interpreting FELA, therefore, characterized it
as remedial4 36and humanitarian. 437 These interpretations arose
because FELA offered broader remedies to injured employees
than those that previously existed under state tort law.438
Under FELA, contributory negligence only diminishes recovery
in proportion to the employee's negligence, rather than barring re-
covery,439 and assumption of risk is not available as a defense.44 0
Both of these defenses had traditionally precluded recovery by in-
jured workers under state tort law.441 Congress, therefore,
prempted a major area of state tort law when a uniform law was
necessary to protect railroad workers. Since that time, Congress
has extended the same uniform law to another group in need of
protection (merchant seamen) under the Merchant Marine Act of
1920, commonly known as the Jones Act.,42 In construing each of
these acts, the Supreme Court resolves differences of interpreta-
tion between the circuits, thus preserving uniformity.
Although states' rights concerns may prove to be a political bar-
rier to enactment of federal product liability legislation,4 4 3 the
431. As one commentator observed:
Almost every leading case in tort law was corrected, mediately or im-
mediately, with this new and dreadful presence. In this first genera-
tion of tort law, the railroad was the prince of machines, both as
symbol and as fact. It was the key to economic development....
Yet trains were also wild beasts; they roared through the countyside,
killing livestock, setting fires to crops, smashing passengers and
freight. Railroad law and tort law grew up then, together. In a sense
the two were the same.
L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 410 (1973).
432. See Griffith, supra note 430, at 162.
433. Id. at 162-63 (citing Third Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission 85 (1889)).
434. Griffith, supra note 430, at 162.
435. Id. at 165 (quoting Address by Edward A. Mosely, reproduced in 10 R.R.
TRAINMEN'S J. 930-39, 853 (Oct., 1893)).
436. Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 329-30 (1958).
437. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
438. Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 330 (1958).
439. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1982).
440. 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1982).
441. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 431, at 411-13.
442. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
443. See 1 LEGAL STUDy, supra note 14, at 32-33.
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FELA demonstrates that the real question should be whether or
not these concerns form the basis of a valid objection to federal
action. One can accept the principles of federalism and still recog-
nize that national problems must be dealt with by the federal gov-
ernment. Product-related injuries are a national problem.
Insurance rates are set on a national basis,444 and many products
are distributed in all fifty states. As a national problem, the prod-
uct liability problem calls for a national solution. State statutory
reforms have not only failed to relieve uncertainty, but have exac-
erbated it,445 and even a widely-adopted state uniform law would
fail to provide the necessary certainty. 446 If there is to be a solu-
tion, it must come from the federal government.
Similarly, although the concept of each state serving as a "labo-
ratory" to experiment with different approaches to a complex
problem is attractive in theory,447 it exacts a high price in uncer-
tainty from manufacturers, insurers, and even consumers.44 8 In
fact, the years of experimentation with tort theories have created
the present product liability morass. As Professor Schwartz has
noted:
While state experimentation is a valid goal, the state courts have had de-
cades to explore a product liability law. There is a wide range of alterna-
tive approaches from which to choose, and, in light of the magnitude of the
product liability problem, experimentation may come at too high a
price.44 9
Moreover, even conceding the basic validity of the laboratory of
ideas concept, certain institutional barriers prevent the states from
serving as sterile laboratories. In order to be meaningful, an ex-
periment must be controlled: that is, kept independent of outside
influences. Certain factors in the present product liability system,
however, contaminate state experimentation. It has been demon-
strated that product liability rates are highly judgmental, and are
444. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text. In the Introduction to the
Model Uniform Act, the Department of Commerce emphasized the uniquely
national character of the products liability problem: "Uniformity and stabil-
ity in this area are needed because product liability rates are set on a coun-
trywide basis. Thus, product liability law differs from medical malpractice,
automobile, and other standard lines of liability." 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,714
(1979).
445. See supra notes 173-195 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 382-407 and accompanying text.
447. See, e.g., Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 229
(1981).
448. The LEGAL STuDY notes that: "While it is true that a 'patchwork' of conflicting
and confusing rules is a basic characteristic of the process of development of
legal principles by state common law processes, recognition of this tenet of
jurisprudence makes the situation no more palatable to products manufac-
turers." 4 LEGAL STuDY, supra note 14, at 70.
449. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 585.
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heavily influenced by the worst possible theory of liability (from
the insurer's perspective) adopted in any jurisdiction.450 Thus,
any one state's action will be meaningless, unless it establishes a
new outer limit of liability, or pulls back a previously-established
outer limit. Conservative judicial interpretations or legislative re-
forms in any one state will, therefore, have no impact on product
liability rates. 45 1 This inherent inadequacy of state reform has led
several governors to veto their state's reform measures. 452
"Worst case" liability controls on insurance rates both prevent
the states from functioning as laboratories of ideas, and prove that
the state-by-state approach is the antithesis of controlled federal-
ism. States can take no effective action of their own; they are con-
trolled by the actions of sister states. The state-by-state approach
forces manufacturers, and ultimately consumers, to pay insurance
premiums based on legal policies of the most liberal state. Yet
consumers in a conservative product liability jurisdiction may not
be afforded the liberal judicial remedy upon which a manufac-
turer's premium is based. This situation is somewhat analagous to
the economic balkanization that led to the downfall of the Articles
of Confederation. This balkanization was, of course, remedied by
the Constitution's supremacy clause,4 53 which made federal law
the supreme law of the land. Similarly, federal product liability
reform is the only effective manner in which to achieve certainty in
the field of product liability and thereby avoid a system in which
the actions of one state control consequences in all others.
b. Prohibition of Common Law Development of Changes
in Legal Rights and Remedies in Response to New
Conditions
The law is not static. One of the benefits of common law legal
development has been its ability to change with the times, to pro-
vide redress for new types of injuries, and to respond to changing
social conditions. 454 Certainly, any law that seeks certainty must
sacrifice some degree of flexibility. Accordingly, the issues regard-
ing federal tort reform are whether the increase in certainty out-
weighs the loss of flexibility, and whether the loss in flexibility can
be minimized.
Although the costs of uncertainty have been documented, many
450. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
451. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
452. See Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,716-17 (1979) (noting
that the Maine legislative report voiced similar concerns).
453. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
454. For a thorough discussion praising the benefits of such a system, see Ursin,
supra note 447.
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have supported the position that common law development as-
sures laws that adapt to changing conditions and times. This was
the argument of Roscoe Pound when he noted that: "An uncodi-
fled law able to develop experience by reason and test reason by
experience is proving to make our law of torts equal to its task by
working out principles-starting points for reasoning-in the or-
derly course of judicial decision." 455 Others have spelled out dan-
gers of seeking certainty through statutes. They argue that
because statutes have primacy over judicial interpretation, stat-
utes lack the flexibility necessary in the face of constantly chang-
ing conditions.456 Statutes, in other words, become obsolete, yet
political realities often prevent their repeal or amendment.45 7
There are, however, legislative solutions available that remove
such objections. For example, a "nonprimacy of statutes act"
could treat a uniform product liability statute, twenty years after
its enactment, as if it were a common law principle.458 The effect of
such an act would be to allow courts to limit, extend, or overrule
the statute based upon information and/or legal arguments gath-
ered since its enactment.45 9 Allowing such treatment of a uniform
product liability act would validate the judicial revision already en-
gaged in by the courts, and would keep them from trying to
achieve "just" results through indirect means, which in turn im-
pair other legal principles.46 0
Other drafting procedures could also minimize the loss of com-
mon law flexibility. Certain sections of a uniform federal statute
could be drafted so as not to foreclose relief for types of injuries
that have yet to manifest themselves.461 In addition, Congress
could establish a permanent board to review federal product liabil-
ity law, and to propose revisions to Congress as needed.462 While
455. Pound, Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1957).
456. See, e.g., Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 VT. L.
REv. 247, 247 (1979); Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Non-
primacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REV. 203, 203-04 (1979).
457. See Davies, supra note 456, at 203.
458. Id. at 204-05.
459. Id. at 205.
460. See Calabresi, supra note 456, at 252-53. One of these indirect ways is noted
both by Calabresi and Professor Gilmore, who observed that courts constitu-
tionalized two issues, birth control and abortion, which were presented by
unpopular and ancient statutes. Gilmore, Putting Senator Davies in Context,
4 VT. L. REv. 233, 239-40 & n.8 (1979).
461. For example, a statute of repose could be drafted to exclude injuries that
manifest themselves over a long period of time-such as asbestos-from the
operation of the limitation period.
462. It is well-known that there is a Permanent Editorial Board (P.E.B.) for the
UCC. One of the chief reasons for establishing the P.E.B. in 1961 was the
tendency of states to amend the UCC before they enacted it. See Minahan,
supra note 392, at 808; Note, supra note 393, at 725.
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this board would be directed to consider the overriding need for
certainty before recommending revisions, it could provide a mech-
anism for truly needed change. Moreover, revision would be ac-
complished through a single enactment, rather than through the
piecemeal approach of the present system, which further multi-
plies uncertainty.463
In summary, while responsiveness is one of the great virtues of
the common law, responsiveness in present product liability law is
undermined by the balkanization inherent in the current sys-
tem.464 Flexibility can be built into federal reform, allowing a nec-
essary degree of responsiveness, while promoting a higher degree
of certainty than is found presently in the law.
2. Practical Objections to Federal Reform
Various pragmatic objections have arisen to the concept of fed-
eral product liability reform. It is argued that political realities
make federal reform unlikely, or that if a statute is enacted, it will
be declared unconsitutional. It has also been asserted that such
reform will burden the already staggering federal judicial system,
and will not, in any event, resolve uncertainty in product liability.
Actually, the political prospects for federal product liability re-
form no longer appear bleak. Business and trade leaders are put-
ting increasing pressure on Congress to adopt federal
legislation,4 65 and the concept has been endorsed by the Reagan
administration.466 In spite of opposition from the American Bar
Association, federal product liability reform legislation was intro-
duced in the 98th Congress both in the Senate46 7 and the House.4 68
463. One of the major causes of lack of uniformity in the UCC has been the unwill-
ingness of states to follow the recommendations of the P.E.B. A glaring ex-
ample is the experience with the 1972 revisions to Article 9: "Ironically,
therefore, the promulgations of the 1972 Official Text may have an effect ex-
actly the opposite of that intended: it may prove to be a permanent source of
disparity in commercial law since it produces substantial variance between
enacting and non-enacting states." Minahan, supra note 392, at 810. Of
course, the P.E.B. has no means of imposing its revisions on the state. Id. at
809. Although such a Board under a national law would also lack the power to
impose its recommendations on Congress, at least those recommendations
would be accepted, rejected, or amended by only one body, and this
uniformly.
464. See, e.g., supra notes 387-91 and accompanying text.
465. Bus. INs., Oct. 5, 1981, at 1, 38.
466. Bus. INs., July 25, 1983, at 1. This endorsement is, however, apparently not
enthusiastic. Bus. INs., May 23, 1983, at 1.
467. Senator Kasten has reintroduced his bill (S. 2631, Product Liability Reform),
which would create a national code for product liability. S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) (The Product Liability Act). At the same time, however, there is
continued opposition to such a law by the American Bar Association [Cur-
rent Report] PROD. SAFETY & LipAB. REP. (BNA) at 115 (Feb. 11, 1983).
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The assertion that product liability reform is political infeasibility
is thus clearly premature.
Similarly, the argument that a federal product liability law, if
adopted, would be found unconstituonal is also premature. The
constitutionally of federal tort reform would turn, in part, on the
content of the legislation adopted. There is, however, substantial
reason to believe that a federal tort reform proposal would pass
constitutional muster.4 69
Opponents of federal reform suggest that such reform would vi-
olate equal protection by singling out one part of the common law
tort system for change.70 Any statutory measure in this area,
however, would be evaluated under the "rational basis" standard
of equal protection review, rather than "strict scrutiny."4 7 ' Estab-
lishing uniformity of product law is rationally related to the legiti-
mate governmental purpose of trying to resolve problems created
by the present patchwork of state laws and the resulting
uncertainty.
A due process attack on federal reform would seem to be
equally unavailing. It is well settled that a statute depriving either
plaintiffs or defendants of common law remedies or defenses does
468. The proposed act was introduced by Rep. Norman Shumway. H.R. 2729, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REc. E. 1821-23 (daily ed.) (The Product Liability
Act of 1983).
469. This point may be important in gaining political support for federal reform. It
has been observed that, although many manufacturers and insurers favor
federal reform, others support state-level reform, largely because they as-
sume federal reform is unconstitutional. Bus. INs., Nov. 1, 1976, at 1. If the
skeptics could be convinced that federal reform is constitutional, they might
reverse their pro-state stand.
470. The fifth amendment, which operates against the federal government, does
not have an equal protection clause. However, an equal protection compo-
nent has been incorporated into the fifth amendment's due process clause,
just as most of the protections of the Bill of Rights have been selectively in-
corporated to operate against the states through the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974)
(provision in Social Security Act for determining eligibility of illegitimate
children invalid); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racial segregation by
D.C. public school system violated 5th amend. due process clause).
471. See 4 LEGAL STUDY, supra note 14, at 78. The basic framework of traditional
equal protection analysis provides that:
We must decide, first, whether [the legislation] operates to the disad-
vantage of some suspect class or inpinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requir-
ing strict judicial scrutiny ... If not, the [legislative] scheme must
still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some
legitimate, articulated state purpose ....
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). The Bur-
ger Court has also recognized a middle tier of scruitiny for sex-based classifi-
cations. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
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not per se violate due process. 472 The test is whether the statute
bears a reasonable relationship to the permissible goals that it in-
tends to further.473 The federal statute would obviously bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the permissible goal of creating uniformity
in the product liability system.
There is some question as to whether a statute abrogating com-
mon law remedies must provide a quid pro quo for those remedies
in order to withstand due process attack, although the Supreme
Court has never directly so held.474 The Court did suggest in N.Y.
Central R.R. v. White,475 however, that a statutory quid pro quo is
important when upholding a statute that abrogates common law
rights against a due process attack.47 6 In any event, if such a quid
pro quo is required, federal product liability legislation should pro-
vide the necessary exchange. In exchange for the loss of common
law rights, the statute would provide a remedy under federal law,
and the concomitant benefits of uniformity.
Of course, federal tort reform would be predicated upon federal
power under the commerce clause.47 7 Studies have concluded that
federal product liability legislation would be constitutional under
the commerce clause, noting that little impact upon interstate
commerce need be shown to justify federal action.478 Even local
activity may be regulated "if it exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce ... irrespective of whether such effect is
what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or
'indirect.' "479 It is unlikely that the revitalization of the tenth
amendment 480 by National League of Cities v. Usery481 will prove a
barrier to legislation in such an inherently interstate area. For ex-
ample, no serious challenge to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act482 has been mounted, and that legislation covers matters that
would probably be dealt with in any federal product liability re-
form measure.483 The constitutional viability of FELA also indi-
472. See, e.g., N.Y. Central R.R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 202 (1917).
473. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963).
474. See, e.g., 4 LEGAL STUDY, supra note 14, at 82.
475. 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (upholding constitutionality of New York's Workmen's
Compensation Statute).
476. Id. at 197-202. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group Inc.,
438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding Price-Anderson Act's limitation liability for nu-
clear power plant accidents).
477. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
478. See 4 LEGAL STUDy, supra note 14, at 72.
479. Wickerd v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
480. The amendment provides that: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend X.
481. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
482. See supra note 429.
483. Cf. Taylor, supra note 359, at 363 n.104. It should be noted that the fact that
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cates that such reform would withstand substantial constitutional
challenge.
Another objection to federal reform, which is now heard with
less frequency than it once was, is that reform would require crea-
tion of yet another federal bureaucracy. This objection miscon-
strues the likely nature of federal reform. No administrative
agency need be created, no rules or regulations promulgated, and
no reports filed. As with the Jones Act484 and FELA,485 no federal
bureaucracy is likely to arise to administer federal product liability
reform. At most, Congress might form a small advisory body to
make recommendations concerning further needed reform.486
Of more weight is the objection to federal product liability re-
form based on its impact on the federal judiciary. Serious over-
crowding of federal courts has been noted recently by Chief
Justice Burger and others.487 If a federal reform law were passed
that vested jurisdiction in the federal judiciary, the federal court
workload would increase significantly. Such an objection, how-
ever, assumes that Congress would leave federal courts as they
now exist, dumping thousands of cases on them with no adjust-
ment in capacity. There are, however, ways to solve any possible
overcrowding problem.
First, Congress could establish more judgeships, or create a
separate product liability court, much like the tax court or bank-
ruptcy court.488 This latter approach would probably achieve the
maximum degree of uniformity. Congress could also abolish diver-
sity jurisdiction, as has been proposed, to compensate for the in-
crease in the product liability load.489 Alternatively, federal
jurisdiction could be made concurrent with state jurisdiction, with
federal actions limited by stringent jurisdictional amounts, or
other restrictive requirements. 490 Finally, jurisdiction could be
federal legislation would pass constitutional muster does not mean that state
courts could not find state legislation unconstitutional. As to state constitu-
tional questions, state supreme courts are the final authority and they have
been much more active in striking down economic legislation under state due
process clauses. See generally E. BARRETT, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 678-79 (1977).
484. See supra note 442 and accompanying text.
485. See supra notes 429-41 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 462-63 and accompanying text.
487. E.g., Chief Justice Burger's 1977 Report to the American Bar Association, 63
A.B.A. J. 504 (1977); Burger, Annual Report of the State of the Judiciary, 61
A.B.A. J. 439 (1975).
488. Congress has the power "to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme
court." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
489. C. MCCORMICK, J. CHADBOURN & C. WRIGHT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FED-
ERAL COURTS iv-v (Supp. 1981). See also Taylor, supra note 359, at 364 & n.105.
490. Cf. Taylor, supra note 359 at 364-65.
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placed with the states. Interpretational differences between states
could then be resolved by the Supreme Court or, as has been rec-
ommended in a different context, by a national appellate court.491
A final practical objection to federal tort reform is that, even if it
is achieved, it will not provide desired uniformity. The focus of
this objection is that the process of judicial interpretation would
ultimately undermine the certainty provided by even federal re-
form legislation.492 The significance of this objection would seem
to rest in the jurisdictional grants made by a new federal law. If
Congress creates a product liability court, its centralized powers
would enable it to eliminate considerable uncertainty in product
liability law. On the other hand, if new legislation establishes con-
current jurisdiction between existing federal and state courts,
there is greater room for uncertainties of interpretation to creep
into uniform federal law. But even with concurrent jurisdiction, a
federal law would still secure a much higher degree of certainty
than the present system.
First, inherent uncertainties of the status quo would be elimi-
nated, and, the vagaries of multiple courses of action would be re-
solved. A clear definition of "defect" would also greatly enhance
the prospects for certainty, and confusing state reforms would be
superceded. Second, because the need for federal legislation is
premised on the need for certainty, careful and precise draftsman-
ship would carry a high congressional priority.493 Third, state
courts could well give great deference to federal court interpreta-
tions. As Professor Gilmore has observed, commercial law
achieved significant uniformity in the nineteenth century in the
heyday of Swift v. Tyson, 494 because state courts were more than
willing to follow the "general" common law as announced by the
federal courts.495 Fourth, Congress could vest appellate jurisdic-
tion over the state courts in the lower federal courts. Although this
is a novel approach, it has been suggested as one way to achieve a
greater degree of uniformity while leaving the bulk of litigation in
state courts. 496
Of course, one of the main reasons that uncertainty of interpre-
491. Chief Justice Burger recommends such a court for resolving conflicts at the
federal circuit level. The Justice Department has endorsed the idea, and a
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee has approved it. Wermeil, Justices Seek
Ways to Ease Big Case Load, Wall St. J., July 8, 1983, at 23, col. 3.
492. See 4 LEGAL STuDY, supra note 14, at 74.
493. Cf. Taylor, supra note 359, at 365.
494. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 1 (1842).
495. Gilmore, Commerical Law in the United States: Its Codification and other
Misadventures, in ASPECTS OF CoMPARATmVE COMMERCIAL LAW 449, 454 (J.
Ziegel & W. Foster eds. 1969), quoted in, Taylor, supra note 359, at 365.
496. See Taylor, supra note 359, at 366.
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tation permeates the UCC is that there is no final arbiter of inter-
pretation.497 Even under a concurrent jurisdiction approach to
product liability, however, if there is a uniform federal law the
Supreme Court would be available ultimately to resolve important
questions of statutory conflict. This would provide a much higher
level of uniformity than is presently possible.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests strongly that federal reform provides the
best solution to important problems in the current product liability
system. Massive uncertainty in the substantive law of product lia-
bility has precipitated these problems. Almost any product related
suit can involve three different causes of action. In the field of
strict product liability, the states cannot agree upon a definition for
a "defective" product. New theories of liability, such as the Sindell
market share approach, develop rapidly, making it difficult for in-
surers to assess exposure to potential future liability. Most impor-
tantly, insurers and manufacturers perceive the uncertainty to be
even greater than it is.
The costs of the product liability problem are real. Although
insurance remains generally available, its costs have risen dramat-
ically, and partial unavailability problems are prevalent. Uncer-
tainty has also exacted a heavy psychological toll from
manufacturers and insurers. Product development and innovation
have been jeopardized. Product liability problems have even
threatened to drive large companies out of business, and the abil-
ity of some firms to respond to product liability judgments is im-
paired. The impact of the present product liability system on
consumer prices is difficult to measure. However, to the extent
that insurance costs are reflected in higher product prices, con-
sumers in conservative jurisdictions are being forced to pay for
remedies available only in more liberal jurisdictions.
Only federal reform can provide the certainty in product liabil-
ity law required by a national system of product manufacturing,
distribution, and sales. Present state reforms have actually in-
creased the level of uncertainty, and the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act has yet to be enacted in any jurisdiction. Moreover,
due to non-uniform amendments and differing court interpreta-
tions, the model uniform law approach is inherently flawed, and
could not achieve the certainty needed even if it were widely
adopted. Finally, the objections to federal reform cannot with-
stand close scrutiny. Even if federal reform vested jurisdiction
497. See supra notes 462-63 and accompanying text.
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concurrently in the state and federal courts, it would achieve a de-
gree of uniformity unattainable at the state level.
One theme that underlies this Article is that manufacturers and
insurers perceive product liability problems to be even worse than
they actually are. The product liability "grapevine," carrying its
often patently false horror stories, exemplifies this phenomenon.
Because product liability insurance decisions rely so heavily on
the insurer's judgment, perception plays a pivotal role in assessing
the effectiveness of any proposed solution to product liability
problems. Federal reform would provide the best answer to
problems of perception. Action at the federal level would send a
strong signal to manufacturers and insurers that the government is
serious about ending the uncertainty that permeates present prod-
uct liability laws. Insurers could plan in a more stable environ-
ment, and actuarial determination of premium rates would be
more feasible. In addition, insurers could rely more on statistical
data, and less on the "grapevine," the "worst possible case," or
their own predictions about future exposure to liability.
The most significant objection to federal reform seems to be a
belief that it violates the principle of federalism: that federal re-
form would intrude upon states' rights. This objection ignores the
inherently national character of our product liability system. In-
deed, far from being the antithesis of federalism, federal product
liability reform would exemplify one of federalism's most funda-
mental tenets: national problems warrant federal action.
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